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MINERAL EXPLORATION FUNDS
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL*
While independent mineral operators have traditionally been
confronted with a scarcity of risk capital for mineral development,
willing investors have often experienced -equal difficulty in locating
responsible mineral operations in which to invest. The explora-
tion fund, a means of channeling risk capital furnished by high-
bracket taxpayers into mineral exploration, is one -answer to this
dilemma. In this article the author deals extensively with the
mineral, tax, business association, and securities law problems in-
volved in the organization and operation -of such a fund.
NDEPENDENT mineral operators have decried for years the lack
of available capital for mineral development. Yet those with
capital to venture often have equal difficulty in finding responsible
mineral operators. Since the available capital is very likely to be
found in locales (generally the eastern United States) other than
those (generally the western United States) in which mineral opera-
tions are being carried on, problems are presented in bringing to-
gether these two groups with complementary interests. The prin-
cipal legal problems involved in this process are providing appropri-
ate legal vehicles and mechanics through which the varying objec-
tives of the parties can be best realized. One such vehicle is the
exploration fund.
The exploration fund is a means of channeling risk capital
furnished by high-bracket taxpayers into mineral exploration, par-
ticularly for oil and gas. Typically such funds are sponsored ("pro-
moted") by knowledgeable mineral operators who utilize the peculiar
tax advantages of mineral operations to lure capital. For this reason,
exploration funds are generally designed to permit the taxpayer-
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investor to write off a substantial portion of his "investment" as a
deduction against current income. While many funds offer their
securities publicly, undoubtedly there are a number of private place-
ments of such securities. Although in the past exploration funds
have been concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with oil and gas
exploration and development, there are no inherent reasons why
such funds could not be utilized as advantageously for other types of
mineral exploration. The parties participating in an exploration
fund are likely to be represented by counsel which are widely sepa-
rated geographically and of widely diverse backgrounds and ex-
periences. Eastern counsel, for example, is likely to be more
familiar with the legal implications of financing and general taxation,
whereas western counsel is likely to be more familiar with mineral
law and mineral taxation. The primary objective of this article is to
provide a common understanding for counsel wherever located with
respect to the mineral, tax, SEC, business association, and other
problems involved in the organization, financing, and operation of
such funds.
A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE ExPLORATION FUND
The prospectuses filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission by seven exploration funds having 1967 programs have
been examined in connection with the preparation of this article.'
The seven funds were chosen at random, but the sampling is not
necessarily representative since there were at least twenty-three addi-
tional exploration funds which filed registration statements with
the Commission pertaining to 1967 exploration programs.2 How-
ever, the funds examined do appear to cover a wide variety of arrange-
ments and, while probably not exhausting the possibilities in this
regard, appear to reflect the more likely alternatives. No examina-
tion has been made of funds which have been financed in reliance on
the exemption for non-public offerings.
While there may be significant variations in the arrangements
Two of the exploration funds examined were under common control and offered
similar programs except that one limited itself to the exploration of unproven ("wild-
cat") properties whereas the other acquired only proven and semi-proven properties.
2 See Securities Act Registration List, 1967 CCH FED. SEc. L. REPl. p. 8011. Since
at any one time this list shows only registration statements which were filed and are
not yet effective or those which became effective within the last three months, the
author's count is necessarily incomplete. Successive separate offerings of funds which
are otherwise identical have been counted as a single fund.
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chosen by a promoter, a sale of a security is generally contemplated 3
by which the sponsor is to receive from investors monies or a com-
mitment to make monies available for use in the acquisition and
drilling of oil and gas properties. In return the sponsor makes avail-
able to the fund the necessary administrative experience and is re-
sponsible for the acquisition of the mineral properties, as well as
their exploration, development, and operation. All of the funds
examined were of the "blank check" type; i.e., none of them had
specific properties in the fund or committed to the fund at the date
of the prospectus. In most instances the investors had no control
over the choice of properties acquired for the fund, although one plan
did allow each investor the option of refusing to participate in spe-
cific acquisitions, and another fund granted such a choice to certain
categories of participants. Five of the seven funds intended pri-
marily, if not exclusively, to acquire unproven ("wildcat") oil and
gas properties. One of the funds planned to acquire only proven
and semi-proven interests, and the remaining fund intended to
acquire primarily proven properties, although its ability to do so
appears questionable. One of the "wildcat" funds also represented
that it intended to secure properties amenable to a secondary recov-
ery program.4 Five of the funds anticipated exploration exclusively
within or off shore of the United States, with three of them hoping
to concentrate their acquisitions primarily in the Texas and mid-
continent areas. One plan foresaw only Canadian and off shore
development; and another fund, while planning to acquire properties
primarily in the United States, reserved the right to spend one-third
of the proceeds on Turkish oil and gas interests.
Of the seven funds examined, five employed underwriters and
paid underwriting commissions. The other two funds offered their
securities directly through the employees of the sponsor, one paying
commissions to such employees and the other placing one of its
employees on a salary for supervising the offering.5 The under-
See text accompanying notes 153-60 infra.
'Orthodox drilling and producing techniques never withdraw all of the oil in a
reservoir because the natural pressure necessary to force up the oil is inevitably ex-
hausted before the mineral source is exhausted. A secondary recovery program involves
an attempt to secure further production by injecting water or gas into the reservoir at
strategic points with the hope that part of the remaining oil will be driven toward
existing wells.
rSome of the sponsors may arguably be "brokers" as that term is defined by
§ 3 (a) (4) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (4) (1964), or "broker-
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writing commissions paid varied from two to seven percent" and, in
most cases, a substantial portion of the underwriting commissions
was reallowable to participating dealers.7 Two underwriting firms
were apparently organized for the specific purpose of offering securi-
ties of the particular exploration fund from which the firm's com-
pensation was paid. In two other instances the underwriters were
established securities firms which were either primarily responsible
for or closely associated with the sponsorship of the fund. In only
one plan did the underwriter appear to have no affiliation with the
sponsor or the fund. All the underwritings were on a best-efforts
basis, and in all programs the expenses of the offering were to come
out of the proceeds of the offering. Estimates of such expenses varied
from $18,000 to $50,000.
Generally, the sponsor company, its officers, directors, or affiliates
claimed prior experience with oil and gas exploration, although the
extent of such experience varied considerably. Only one of the
funds had an experienced staff which devoted all of its efforts to the
management of exploration funds. The direction of the other six
funds was a part-time endeavor for the particular staffs. However,
several of the sponsor companies had organized similar funds in the
past and, in fact, the usual approach for such companies appears to
be to organize separate exploratory funds on an annual basis.
In all seven funds the sponsor or management company was
dealers" within the definition of § 401 (c) of the Uniform Securities Act. A sponsor's
classification as a "broker" under § 3 (a) (4) would depend upon his being "engaged
in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others . ..."
15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (4) (1964) (emphasis added). It appears to be difficult to conclude
that exploration fund sponsors could be so classified unless the fund is viewed as some
type of "entity." However, under the Uniform Securities Act broker-dealer classifica-
tion would follow if the sponsor were found to be a non-issuer engaged in the business
of effecting transactions in securities for its own account. The possible classification
of the sponsor as an issuer is discussed in the text accompanying notes 161-68 infra.
A few states require a form of broker-dealer registration for an "issue-dealer." E.g.,
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 125-1-2, -12- (1963). In any event, registration as an "agent"
would be necessary under §§ 401 (b) and 201 (a) of the Uniform Securities Act for
those active in the sale of fund interests. This registration may involve among other
things furnishing an appropriate bond and passing a mandatory examination. Whether
such persons would be "brokers" under the Exchange Act, and subject to registration
thereunder, would depend upon whether their activities in selling such securities con-
stituted a "business." See generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECuRITIES LAw 209-11 (1966).
'In two of the funds examined by the author the dealers' commissions were paid
by the sponsor and were not taken out of the participants' investments.
I All of the funds, including those not employing an underwriter, invited participa-
tion by members of the National Association of Securities Dealers, with appropriate
commissions payable to those securing purchasers.
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compensated primarily, though not always exclusively, by the grant
of an interest in the properties to be acquired by the fund. Three
sponsor companies acquired a so-called "carried-interest" which per-
mitted the investors to receive the return of their investment before
participation by the sponsor. The sponsor's compensation in two
funds under common control took the form of a net profit interest
defined in a manner which granted the sponsor-manager immediate
participation with general investors. Another fund's manager-
sponsor was allowed immediate participation during the payout
period, which at the sponsor's election could be converted into a net
profit interest after payout to investors. The sponsor of the seventh
fund did not receive an interest in the property on which exploratory
wells were drilled, but was granted an undivided proprietary right
in surrounding acreage. Thus, this latter sponsor would benefit
from its promotion of the fund only if the contemplated exploration
was successful. While successful development might appear requisite
to the compensation of sponsors who received only a carried interest,
since their participation is subordinate to that of the general in-
vestor, a few of these sponsors took compensation directly out of the
offering proceeds and/or realized profits in the sale of properties to
the fund. Yet, one is impressed with the fact that in general
the manager-sponsors are utilizing these funds primarily as a means
of obtaining mineral interests at no risks to themselves. In two
of the funds examined a substantial portion of the sponsor-manager's
own monies would be invested, since these promoters were com-
mitted to contribute amounts to the fund on the same basis as the
general public. One suspects that the reasonableness of the under-
writing and management "fee" arrangements may have been "en-
couraged" by attitudes informally expressed by members of the SEC
staff.
Of the five funds anticipating exploration of wildcat oil prop-
erties, four proposed that offering proceeds would be used only in
the drilling of exploratory wells and would not be used to complete
wells or to drill additional development wells in the event oil should
be discovered. The four plans contemplated either borrowing funds
for these purposes,8 or "assessing" the participants for their propor-
8 Prior to completion of a well, it is difficult to determine whether an apparent dis-
covery will in fact produce oil in commercial quantities. Further, there is a very real
possibility that mechanical difficulties will be encountered in completing and/or
Vol. 1968: 193]
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tionate share of completion or development costs. While in most
cases the participants did not have to contribute to the cost of drilling
development wells, the investor typically had a firm obligation to
bear his proportionate share of the expense of completing a well that
had yielded an oil producing sand. If a participant fails to meet this
obligation, he is generally subject to a penalty in favor of the person
making a contribution on his behalf. Under some arrangements
he forfeits all of his interest in the acreage other than the unit
on which the exploratory well has been drilled. Usually the person
advancing the non-contributor's share of such costs is entitled to
recover three hundred percent of the amount advanced out of the
defaulter's share of production in the event the well should be
successful.
The funds examined generally contemplated the immediate dis-
tribution to the investors of the proceeds from production. Never-
theless, two of the funds, both under affiliated sponsorship, required
all amounts generated through production or otherwise to be re-
invested for a period of ten years. The majority of the funds ex-
amined were established on an annual basis-monies were raised and
expended during a given year and the participants' obligations
terminated after the initial commitment had been depleted. One of
the funds, however, required annual commitments over an indefinite
number of years. All the funds had minimum commitment require-
ments varying from $1,500 in one fund to $25,000 in another. Pre-
sumably, a large minimum commitment should be effective in screen-
ing out small investors.
THE ANALOGY TO MUTUAL FUNDS
The use of the term "fund" suggests that exploration funds have
something in common with mutual funds and some of the plans
examined were not beyond exploiting this identification. Thus,
three of the seven funds used the word "Fund" in their name and
their prospectuses utilized words such as "Plan," "Participant,"
"Withdrawal Plan," "Custodian," and "Manager," all of which are
familiar mutual fund terminology. Only two of the seven expressly
stated that their operations were not investment companies.
producing a well. In light of these two factors, borrowing production funds on the
basis of an apparent discovery may prove to be difficult. It would be even more
difficult to borrow funds for the purpose of drilling a development well, because a
substantial njmber of such wells are failures. See note 10 infra,
[Vol. 1968:193
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In a general sense exploration and mutual funds do have some
things in common. One of the principal similarities is that both
have "managers" who provide the administration and professional
services necessary to select and supervise the funds' investments-
in one case the acquisition of mineral properties and in the other
the selection of a portfolio of securities. Other similarities include
the pooling of funds of many investors with the enhanced oppor-
tunity for diversification. Exploration funds, unlike other means
sometimes employed to attract the same source of capital,9 are estab-
lished with a view to acquisition and exploration of multiple prop-
erties, thereby spreading risk and opportunities. This is particularly
important in view of the statistically remote chances of finding oil.1o
One of the funds examined, for example, represented that it would
use its best efforts to obtain and drill not less than ten drilling blocks
annually.
Notwithstanding the similarities, the differences between explora-
tion funds and mutual funds are more apparent. For example, an
exploration fund is not an investment company under the Invest-
ment Company Act and hence not subject to the same type of regu-
lation as the mutual fund. Thus, many opportunities for self-dealing
and potential conflicts of interest exist as to exploration funds which
would be proscribed under the Investment Company Act.1 More-
over, investments are in mineral properties, not securities, and in-
volve mineral operations rather than the passive holding of a port-
'The technique of selling fractional undivided interests in a single undrilled well
has often been used to finance oil and gas exploration through investments by high-
bracket taxpayers. A partial exemption from registration for such offerings not exceed-
ing $100,000 is provided by Regulation B, 17 C.F.R. § 230.310 (1967), and form S-10 is
especially designed for the filing of such interests. See generally Bloomenthal, SEC
Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, 7 Wyo. L.J. 49 (1953). The Securities Act Registra-
tion List, supra note 2, disclosed only one registration statement relating to such an
offering. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, 173 offering sheets were filed
under Regulation B and aggregate sales reported thereunder were $1,603,144. 33 SEC
ANN. R P. 40 (1966-67).
1 0During 1966 there were 9,214 exploratory wells drilled in the United States, of
which 1,037 were completed as oil wells, 631 as gas wells, and 7,546 as dry holes.
Thus, the total successful completion rate was 18.1%, or slightly better than one out
of six. The success ratio varied from a low of 8.7%, or slightly better than one out of
12, in California to a high of 44.6% in the northeastern United States-West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and New York. These statistics do not, of course, reflect the quality of
the completions. During the same year 23,769 development wells were drilled, of
which 6,011, or 25.3%, were dry. See 65 OiL & GAs J. 135, 146 (1967).
21 See text accompanying notes 149-53 infra.
Vol. 1968: 193]
200 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1968:193
folio of securities.' 2 Mutual funds have their primary appeal to
relatively unknowledgeable, small investors; whereas investors in an
exploration fund are likely to be-and should be-relatively sophisti-
cated and affluent. Exploration fund "managers" have nearly un-
limited discretion in the selection of properties while the manager
of a mutual fund is subject to some limitations under the Invest-
ment Company Act and under the fund's policy as to the type of
securities to be acquired. Finally, the exploration fund is typically
a much more speculative investment than a mutual fund, largely tax
motivated, and with substantially different objectives.
MINERAL OPERATIONS-LEGAL ASPECTS
Since this article is intended to be in the nature of a primer, it
may be helpful to discuss the legal framework in which mineral
exploration generally takes place. Mineral operations of the type
being discussed often involve lands in private ownership as to which
there has been a severance of the surface and mineral rights. The
owner of the mineral rights relating to oil and gas generally is not
regularly engaged in the mineral business and hence is likely to
enter into a lease for the exploration and development of his prop-
erty.'8 The oil and gas lease has become a fairly stereotyped agree-
ment. Its specified duration is ordinarily for a relatively short term
-usually 5 to 10 years-with a habendum clause which provides that
the lease shall continue so long thereafter as oil and gas is produced
in paying quantities on the lessor's property. Under the typical
arrangement, the lessor reserves a royalty interest of normally twelve
and one-half percent of gross income from the oil or gas produced.
However, the lessee can usually avoid any obligation to explore the
property during the primary term of the lease by paying an annual
delay rental and, further, can surrender the lease and all obligations
thereunder by failing to make such annual rental payments. If the
property is considered desirable mineral acreage, the lessee, in order
to acquire the lease, will generally have to pay the owner a cash con-
sideration referred to as a "bonus" payment. After acquiring an
oil or gas lease, the original lessee will very often assign the leasehold,
12 Investments in mineral properties, however, may be "securities" as that term is
used in the Investment Company Act of 1940. See text accompanying notes 146.49
infra.
"For a discussion of private oil and gas leasing and the typical oil and gas lease
see generally 3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAs LAw (1967).
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retaining a so-called overriding royalty interest representing a spe-
cific percentage of the gross proceeds free from all costs of explora-
tion, development, and operation. Since the leaseholder typically
bears all such costs, his interest is often referred to as the working
interest, reflecting the fact that the holder thereof has the exclusive
right to explore and develop the leased property.
In the eleven westernmost states of the United States and in
Alaska, much of the lands available for oil and gas exploration are
part of the public domain and, thus, the right to explore, develop,
and operate such properties can be obtained only pursuant to the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.' 4 With respect to lands located on the
outer continental shelf or within the geologic structure of a known
producing oil and gas field, leases can be obtained only through com-
petitive bidding. Leases on other available federal land, however,
are issued to the first qualified applicant on a non-competitive basis.
Non-competitive federal oil and gas grants are for a primary term of
ten years with the typical habendum and delay rental clauses found
in private leases. To acquire such an interest, the applicant must
pay in advance a filing fee of ten dollars and the first-year rental of
fifty cents per acre. Like private leasehold agreements, federal land
leases can be allowed to lapse in subsequent years by failure to pay
the annual rental. Since most desirable federal lands have already
been leased, the non-competitive leases currently available are either
those which a lessee has permitted to terminate by non-payment of
rent or those which have expired at the end of the lease term because
of a failure to obtain production. With respect to these lands, the
Bureau of Land Management has established simultaneous filing
procedures which generally allow a five-day period in which all appli-
cants may submit their lease offers. Since typically several applicants
will have submitted the necessary offer within the requisite period,
a drawing is held to determine the "winner" of the particular lease.
Federal leases provide for royalties payable to the federal government
in the amount of twelve and one-half percent with respect to non-
competitive leases and a scaled royalty in the case of competitive
grants.
1430 U.S.C. § 223 (1964). For a discussion of federal oil and gas leasing see generally
Rocr MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES
(1968). See also F. TRELEASE, H. BLOOMENTIIAL & J. GERAUD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
NATURAL REsouRcEs 614-723 (1965).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The oil and gas industry also employs a variety of farm-out
arrangements pursuant to which the owner of mineral rights assigns
an interest therein in return for the drilling of a well. These arrange-
ments are often motivated by a desire to share, and thus reduce,
risks and/or the need for financial assistance. Although major oil
companies farm out acreage to other major companies and to inde-
pendents, the extent the grantors are willing to do so and the quality
of the acreage assigned is dependent upon their own exploration
budget. Farm-out arrangements take many forms, such as an un-
divided interest in the acreage to be drilled, a divided checker-
boarded interest, or a retained overriding royalty. Risk distribu-
tion may also vary. The assignee, for example, may be obligated
for all the drilling and completion costs; or for only the drilling
costs and his proportionate part of the completion costs. Moreover,
he may have the right to recover his costs out of production.
Mineral rights relating to resources other than oil and gas vary
somewhat from the procedures outlined above, since in the western
states only a small portion of the desirable lands are in private owner-
ship. To the extent that such lands are privately held, the leasing
arrangements for carrying on general mineral operations will be
similar in general outline to those employed with respect to oil and
gas, although such leases are not nearly as stereotyped. Entirely
different procedures are involved in acquiring metalliferous min-
eral rights with respect to government lands,' 5 since the mineral loca-
tion laws rather than the Mineral Leasing Act are applicable. In
general it is necessary to locate unpatented mining claims covering
lands in the public domain, a task which in practice is most likely
undertaken by persons regularly engaged in the business of carrying
on mineral operations. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for the
original locator to enter into some type of lease or other arrangement
with a more adequately capitalized mining company. These arrange-
ments differ considerably depending upon the mineral involved and
the particular terms negotiated.
MINERAL OPERATIONS-TAx ASPEGTS
The tax advantages of mineral operations include the statutory
depletion deduction which is twenty-seven and one-half percent of
gross income in the case of oil and gas, twenty-three percent in the
2r On mining locations see generally 1 RocKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION,
[Vol. 1968: 193}
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case of uranium, 6 and ranges from twenty-three to five percent with
respect to other mineral property, 17 but cannot exceed fifty percent
of net taxable income (without regard for depletion) from such
property.'8 In the case of minerals other than oil and gas, gross in-
come from the property is the income from "mining," which in many
instances is defined to permit a computation based on added values
to gross income reflecting such considerations as transportation and
milling costs.19 Accordingly, while the statutory depletion rate is
itself lower with respect to minerals other than oil and gas, the effec-
tive depletion rate may be higher,20 since the value of petroleum
resources for gross income purposes must be computed at the well
head.21
The statutory depletion deduction, which can be taken without
regard to actual depletion and does not depend upon the amount
invested in the property, often exceeds the depletion deduction based
upon the actual cost investment in the mineral property.22 De-
pletable capitalized expenditures, therefore, seldom result in tax
benefits.
Since the statutory depletion deduction is in effect a subsidy to
the successful mineral operator whose efforts and risk-taking have
resulted in production, it is undoubtedly a factor in channeling risk
capital into mineral operations. However, it is probably not as im-
portant as the deductions for exploration and development costs in
this regard. These latter deductions can be offset against current in-
AEmRICAN LAw OF MINING 711-906 (1967); and F. TREIMASE, H. BLOOMENTHAL & J.
GERAUD, supra note 14, at 415-613.
'" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613 (b); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2 (a) (1960).
17 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613 (b).18 d.
1Id. § 613 (c). See generally Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income
Taxation (pt. 1), 1 LAND & WATER L. REv. 77, 104-06 (1966).
20 The statutory depletion rate for uranium, for example, is 23%. Assuming a
crude ore price of $4.00 a pound, the depletion deduction would be $0.92 per pound.
Yet, the integrated producer selling concentrate at $8.00 per pound can compute statu-
tory depletion on gross income, which in this instance would be $1.94 per pound or
approximately 48.5% of the value of the crude ore. However, the provision limiting
depletion to 50% of net income will usually come into play and reduce somewhat the
amount of statutory depletion that can actually be taken under these circumstances.
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-3 (1960).
22 The principal items falling into the category of capital costs recoverable through
depletion are acquisition costs, see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1012; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.611-2 (a) (1960), intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and
gas, and exploration costs in the case of other minerals, if capitalized, see INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 263 (c); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (b) (1960).
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come from other sources and, therefore, are factors which make an
exploration fund an extremely attractive investment. While it is not
necessary in most cases to distinguish between oil and gas and other
minerals when dealing with the depletion deduction, except as to
the percentage rate and basis for determing gross income, the tax
consequences differ significantly with respect to exploration and
development expenditures for the various minerals. In the case of
oil and gas, geological and geophysical exploration costs constitute
capital expenditures and not ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses.2 Hence, expenses incurred in geologizing an area, such as
those resulting from seismic surveys, must be capitalized and re-
covered through the depletion deduction regardless of whether they
were incurred for the purpose of determining whether to acquire
a property initially or to retain a property previously acquired.
Geological expenses "necessary in preparation for the drilling" and
in the actual drilling are, however, within the optional deduction
for intangible drilling and development costs discussed below. The
line between geological surveys relating generally to a property and
those relating to the location of a particular drill site is affected by
a number of considerations. The IRS apparently employs the fol-
lowing criteria: 24 (1) To relate to the location of a particular drill
site, and hence to be within the option, the property must be one
already acquired by the taxpayer. (2) Drill site surveys generally
involve a relatively small expenditure and anything in excess of
$3,000 to $4,000 is likely to be challenged. (3) Drill site surveys are
usually followed shortly thereafter by actual drilling. (4) If the
information gathered tends to outline a complete development, the
geological work probably will not be recognized as having been
undertaken to locate a drill site. (5) Drill site surveys are usually
geological rather than geophysical.
Section 1.612-4 (a) of the regulations of the Internal Revenue
Service permit a taxpayer to elect to either capitalize intangible drill-
ing and development costs or write them off as a current expense.
Although from the standpoint of the geologist the drilling of an oil
or gas well may involve either exploration or development, depend-
23 Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 7 T.C. 507 (1946), aff'd on other grounds, 161
F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947); I.T. 4006, 1950-1 Cor. BuLL. 48.
21Hall, Geological and Geophysical Costs, 16 OIL & GAs INST. 581, 592-93 (1965).
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ing upon the extent to which the presence of an oil reservoir has been
previously established, from a tax standpoint no such differentiation
is made between the two activities. Rather, the optional deduction
for intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and
gas is predicated merely on the drilling of a well. In the event the
election is made to capitalize such expenditures, they must be re-
covered through the depletion allowance, except that installation
costs of physical (tangible) equipment must be amortized through
the deduction for depreciation. Furthermore, the election for each
taxpayer is binding as to all future intangibles2 5 Thus, generally
the election should be to deduct such expenditures. 26 No election
with respect to tangible expenditures is provided and, pursuant to
section 1.612-4 (c) of the regulations, all such expenditures must be
capitalized and recovered through depreciation.
In general, intangible drilling and development costs are ex-
penditures which yield no salvage value and are incurred in the
drilling and preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas.
Examples of items subject to the option are:
all amounts paid for labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, and supplies, or
any of them, which are used- (1) In the drilling, shooting, and
cleaning of wells, (2) in such clearing of ground, draining, road
making, surveying, and geological works as are necessary in prepa-
ration for the drilling of wells, and (3) In the construction of
such derricks, tanks, pipelines, and other physical structures as are
necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells
for the production of oil or gas27
Expenditures incurred in the installation as well as construction of
derricks, tanks, pipelines, and other physical structures necessary for
the preparation of the well for production are within the option,2
but the cost of the physical installations themselves must be capitalized
and recovered through depreciation. 29 Accordingly, the cost of items
having salvage value such as drilling tools, pipe, casing, tubing,
tanks, engines, boilers, and pumps must be depreciated. It should
'
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.6124 (e) (1965). The taxpayer who has capitalized intangibles on
producing wells has a further identical election with regard to dry holes. See id.
§ 1.612-4 (b) (4).
21 See Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt. 1), 1 LAND
& WAARm L. Rv. 77, 118-19 (1966).
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (a) (1965).
28 Id.
2. Id. § 1.612-4 (c).
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be noted, however, that the Internal Revenue Service has taken a
narrow view30 of what is involved in preparing a well for produc-
tion and regards a well as completed for production when the casing,
including the "Christmas tree,"3 1 has been installed.
The importance of the intangible deduction in providing capital
to any oil and gas operator cannot be overemphasized. If, for ex-
ample, the operator drills a well on a producing property and the
intangible drilling costs incurred total $60,000, he can, if he has
elected to deduct such costs currently, deduct this amount from the
income received from this property or any other source. Assuming,
for example, that the operator's taxable income before deducting in-
tangibles is $300,000, by taking the intangible deduction he, in effect,
receives $60,000 of this amount free of taxes. The net cost of the
investment for a taxpayer in the highest bracket to the extent repre-
sented by intangibles (and assuming that he does not have other
available deductions) is $18,000 [$60,000 less tax of $42,000 (70%
X $60,000) otherwise payable = $18,000].
In the case of minerals other than oil and gas, the taxpayer has two
basic alternatives with respect to exploration expenditures: an un-
limited deduction under section 617 of the Code subject to recapture
or a limited deduction under section 615 not subject to recapture.
Under section 617 a taxpayer may currently deduct all exploration
expenditures "paid or incurred.., for the purpose of ascertaining the
existence, location, extent or quality of any deposit of ore or other
mineral .... and paid or incurred before the beginning of a develop-
ment stage of the mine . .. ." However, all exploration deductions
taken under section 617 are subject to recapture and, thus, must be
either restored to income in the year in which the property becomes
productive or reclaimed by a reduction of the statutory depletion
deduction relating to that property.32 If prior to recapture the tax-
payer "subleases" the property,3 retaining an overriding royalty and
10 Mem. 6754, 1952-1 CUM. BuLu. 0.
31 The "Christmas tree" is a group of flow control valves which are installed in a
producing well after the casing and tubing but prior to the installation of the pump.
32 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 617 (b) (1).
81 Id. § 617 (c). Mineral tax lore makes some rather unique and fine distinctions
between a sale transaction on the one hand and a lease or sublease on the other. If,
for example, an owner assigns the lease to a producing lessee for a consideration of
$100,000 and retains an oil payment, the transaction is a sale. However, if the
retained interest is an overriding royalty, the transaction would be a sublease. See
generally Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt. 2), 1 LAND
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receiving a cash bonus, the amount of statutory depletion that
ordinarily can be taken with respect to a bonus must be reduced to
the extent of such unrecovered exploration deductions. Further,
statutory depletion cannot be taken on royalty payments until the
balance, if any, of the exploration deduction has been recaptured.
34
If the taxpayer makes a complete disposition of the property through
sale, his gain on the sale will be ordinary income rather than capital
gain to the extent that prior exploration deductions relating to the
property have not been recovered.3 5
With regard to expenditures incurred in the exploration of
minerals other than oil and gas, the other basic alternative is to rely
on the provisions of section 615 of the Code, which in various forms
has been in effect since 1951. However, the elections under sections
615 and 617 are mutually exclusive; and, accordingly, a taxpayer can-
not proceed under one as to some properties and under its com-
panion as to other properties.36 Under section 615 the taxpayer
has the following elections:3 7 (1) He may deduct as an expense in
his tax year up to $100,000 of such expenditures, provided, however,
that all amounts previously or currently being deducted or deferred
with respect to the particular mineral property or any other property
do not exceed $400,000. (2) He may elect to defer such expenditures
in any tax year to the extent of the difference between the amount,
if any, deducted during such year and $100,000, subject to the same
$400,000 overall limitation referred to in (1). In the event the tax-
payer defers exploration expenditures, he may then write them off
pro-ratably against the ore body as it is produced. (3) The taxpayer
& WATER L. REv. 379, 381-91 (1966). For varying tax implications in this context see
note 35 infra.
1 "INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 617 (c).
so Id. The different methods for recapture could affect the form of a particular
transaction. Assume there exists an uranium property with no basis but as to which
$100,000 remains to be recaptured at the time of disposition. This property is to be
"sold" for a consideration of $100,000 and a retained interest. If the retained interest
is an oil payment-thus resulting in a sale-a total recapture can be made on the
transaction. If, on the other hand, the retained interest is an override and the trans-
action is deemed a sublease, only 23% of $100,000, or $23,000, will be recaptured and
$77,000 will remain to be recaptured from depletion attributable to royalty payments.
See Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt. 1), 1 LAND &
WATER L. Rxv. 77, 186-91 (1966). Incomplete dispositions which are "sales" for tax
purposes yield other interesting ramifications for recapture, but they are beyond the
scope of this article.
so INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 615 (f).
7Id. §§ 615 (a)- (c) (1).
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may-and must to the extent the statutory limitations are exceeded-
elect to capitalize such expenditures and recover them through the
depletion deduction. Some tax counselors tend to confuse deferral
and capitalization of mineral exploration expenditures. If these are
deferred, a subsequent expense deduction is allowed against the
production from the ore body discovered as a result of such expendi-
tures. The taxpayer may also take depletion, which will ordinarily
be at the statutory rate since exploration expenditures do not become
part of the taxpayer's basis for depletion purposes. However, when
such costs are deferred, they become part of the taxpayer's basis in
the mineral property for purposes other than determining cost deple-
tion. Alternatively, if the taxpayer capitalizes such expenses, they
become part of his basis for all purposes, including the determina-
tion of cost depletion. Since statutory depletion frequently exceeds
cost depletion, the capitalization of such costs often does not result
in a tax benefit.As
In contrast to the deduction for intangibles relating to oil and
gas operations discussed above, section 615 elections can be made for
separate properties, can be made in whole or in part, and can differ
in each tax year. A taxpayer could, for example, deduct $10,000,
defer $50,000, and capitalize $20,000 of exploration expenditures in
one tax year even though incurred with respect to the same property.
In a following year he could make entirely different elections.
Should the taxpayer receive property through certain types of
non-taxable transfers, including a transfer for stock in a controlled
corporation 39 or in connection with a tax-free corporate merger or
other reorganization, 40 all exploratory expenditures previously de-
ducted or deferred by the transferor must be included in determining
the transferee's $400,000 limitation.41 Under section 1.615-4 of the
regulations, such amounts must be included, even if expended by the
38 It is, of course, conceivable that with respect to high cost properties, cost depletion
will exceed statutory depletion. In addition, if the property is sold, amounts capitalized
will reduce any gain or increase a loss. Further, if a property is abandoned, an ordi-
nary loss deduction may be taken for any amounts capitalized. See text accompanying
notes 49-53 infra. However, the IRS has adopted an approach with respect to capi-
talized exploration expenditures which generally precludes claiming any loss until all
of the properties benefited by such expenditures have been abandoned. See I.T. 4006,
1950-1 Cum. Burr. 48; Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt.
1), 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 77, 163-66 (1966).
89 INT. Ry. CODE OF 1954, §§ 351 (a), 362 (a).
,0 Id. §§ 362 (b), 368 (a).
,1Id. §§ 615 (c) (2)-(3).
[Vol. 1968:193
MINERAL EXPLORATION FUNDS
transferor on properties other than those transferred to the taxpayer.42
The section 617 alternative with respect to exploration expendi-
tures was added in 1966 because of congressional concern that many
taxpayers had exhausted or were close to exhausting the aggregate
limits under section 615.43 For taxpayers who have not exhausted
such limits or are not close to doing so, the logical procedure in most
instances, in view of the structure of the provisions and of the
elections thereunder, would be to initially elect to be taxed under
section 615. A taxpayer may, within three years after making such
an election, revoke his choice and, in effect, retroactively elect for
prior as well as future years to proceed under the provisions of
section 617.44  On the other hand, if a taxpayer initially chooses to
proceed under section 617, his election will be irrevocable once
final regulations are adopted under this section.45  An additional
factor to consider is that section 615 is applicable to exploration ex-
penditures regardless of where incurred, whereas section 617 is
applicable only with respect to exploration expenditures incurred on
properties located within the United States or on its outer con-
tinental shelf.48 Thus, if a taxpayer with substantial mineral opera-
tions outside the United States elected to proceed under section 617,
he could not deduct exploration expenditures on such properties.
A corporation has its own election to make between sections
615 and 617 and is subject to $100,000 and $400,000 limitations under
section 615 separate from those imposed on its shareholders.47 How-
ever, as previously noted, prior transfers to the corporation in non-
taxable transactions may affect the extent to which the aggregate
limit is available to the corporation. Similarly, each participant in
a partnership can make his own election between sections 615 and
617, and each partner has his own separate aggregate and annual limi-
tations under the provisions of section 615.48
" Treas. Reg. § 1.615-4 (1965).
"S. REP. No. 1377, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
INT. R -. CODE OF 1954, § 615 (e).
The election cannot be revoked more than three months after the adoption of
the final regulations under § 17. See id. § 617 (a) (2) (b). As of the date of this
writing (January 20, 1968), final regulations had not been adopted and hence calendar
year taxpayers electing § 617 treatment for 1967 will still have a period of time in
which to revoke their election.
40 Id. § 617 (a) (1).
'7 A corporation is generally a separate tax entity. See id. § 11 (a).
" Id. § 703 (b).
Vol. 1968: 193]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
A final deduction which is relevant to mineral operations is the
deduction for losses "incurred in a trade or business or . . . in any
transaction entered into for profit although not connected with a
trade or business." 49 Losses of this type can be offset against ordinary
income5° and hence have a distinct advantage over a long-term
capital loss. In order to qualify for this deduction, the loss must be
bona fide and "evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed
by identifiable events, and.. . actually sustained during the taxable
year."51 The fact that an asset has lost all of its value is a closed
and completed transaction for this purpose.52 Events establishing
such worthlessness with respect to mineral properties usually involve
drilling a dry hole in the case of oil and gas, or comparable un-
successful drilling or exploratory work for other minerals, preferably,
but not necessarily, accompanied by abandonment of the mineral
property involved.53
The seven exploration funds examined all stressed the tax bene-
fits to be derived from the statutory depletion deduction and the
optional deduction relating to intangible drilling and development
costs. Some of them also referred to the deduction for worthlessness.
In addition, all but one of the prospectuses set forth the tax conse-
quences in the form of an opinion of counsel and in reliance on
counsel as an expert. Moreover, the prospectuses also unequivocally
stated that in the opinion of counsel, the "venture" would not be
classified as an association taxable as a corporation-a determination
which is critical to passing the deductions directly through to the
investor. This aspect of the tax problem, 4 and the sponsors' tax
problems arising out of the interest received by them, 5 are discussed
in succeeding sections.
FORM OF ORGANIZATION-IN GENERAL
The agreements and arrangements employed by the seven ex-
ploration funds generally reflect a high degree of professional com-
,Id. §§ 165 (c) (1)- (2).
oId. § 165 (a).
5 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1 (b) (1960).
'Cf. C.C. Harmon, I T.C. 40 (1942), aff'd on other grounds, 139 F.2d 211 (10th
Cir. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
51 See generally Bloomenthal, A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt. 1),
1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 77, 154-57 (1966).
:6 See text accompanying notes 70-98 infra.
'See text accompanying notes 99-141 infra.
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petence on the part of counsel. Indeed, such skill and ingenuity is
requisite to achieving the following tax objectives of the exploration
fund: (1) the investors should be permitted to take all of the deduc-
tions; (2) the investors should bear the tax on all the income during
"payout"; and (3) the sponsor-manager should receive its interest
in a non-taxable transaction.
A listing of the legal frameworks available for an exploration
fund would include the following:
(1) A fund could be organized as a corporation and could issue
the usual equity securities. If there were less than ten share-
holders involved and certain other requirements were
met,58 the corporation may elect Subchapter S taxation.
Such a corporation would not differ substantially from
other oil and gas or mining companies which propose to
engage primarily in the acquisition and exploration of
mineral properties. However, since the use of a Subchapter
S corporation is limited to a fund with ten or less in-
vestors, it is generally unavailable if securities are to be
publicly offered.
(2) A fund could be organized as a limited partnership with
the sponsor acting as the general partner and the investors
as limited partners.
(3) A fund could be organized as a limited partnership as in
(2) with the limited partners as a group constituting a
separate Subchapter S corporation.
(4) A fund could be organized as a general partnership. The
partners would in all probability be few in number, con-
sisting only of the organizers. The organizers in turn
would offer and assign portions of their interests in part-
nership profits without having their assignees substituted
as partners.57
(5) A fund could be organized so that each of the participants
11 INT. RaV. CODE or 1954, § 1371 (a). To be eligible to make a Subchapter S elec-
tion, the corporation must not: (1) have more than 10 shareholders; (2) have as a
shareholder a trust, corporation, or person (other than an estate) who is not an indi-
vidual; (3) allow its shares to be held by a non-resident alien; or (4) issue more than
one class of stock. Id.
57Nonsubstituting assignments would not terminate the partnership. UNiFoRM
P.,TNERSrup Acr § 27 (1). Only the death of the original partners and not that of
the assignees would terminate the partnership. Id. § 31 (4).
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in the fund held tenancies in common in any mineral
properties acquired. The co-owners could then enter into
an operating agreement designating the sponsor as "opera-
tor" and specifying the respective rights and obligations
of the parties.
(6) A fund could be organized as a "mining partnership" with
the sponsor designated as managing partner.
The foregoing represents the principal alternatives for organ-
izing an exploration fund, although obviously there are numerous
variations with respect to each. Of the seven funds examined, three
employed limited partnership arrangements and four, while vari-
ously styled and differing in detail, involved basically complicated
co-ownership arrangements with operating agreements.
FORM OF ORGANIZATION-THE CORPORATION
The corporation, generally the most favored form of business
organization, is something of a stepchild in a mineral exploration
program designed to maximize tax advantages for the benefit of high-
bracket taxpayers. The reasons for this are at least threefold: (1) the
usual double tax disadvantage involved in the use of a corporation;
(2) the fact that a distribution of depletion reserves is taxed as a
dividend rather than a return of capital to the extent statutory deple-
tion exceeds cost depletion; 8 and (3) the fact that the corporation
form ordinarily does not permit tax deductions to be passed through
to the shareholders. The typical investor in an exploration fund is
looking for his own tax deductions during the current year. The fact
that the corporation may have such tax deductions will not accom-
plish his objectives, particularly if the entity has no offsetting in-
come. Further, if the exploration is successful, cash distributions
to him will be taxable to the extent statutory depletion exceeds cost
depletion, depriving him in large part of the benefit of the stat-
utory depletion deduction. Finally, if the venture fails, the loss
resulting from the sale of his corporate shares or from the worth-
lessness of the shares will be a capital rather than an ordinary
loss.59
If a private placement of fund shares is contemplated, a fund
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2 (e) (1956).
9 INT. RFV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 165 (f)- (g).
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organized as a corporation may be able to utilize Subchapter S and
section 1244 to accomplish the desired tax objectives. To achieve
a Subchapter S election, of course, participants must be limited to
ten individual shareholders. Assuming that Subchapter S is utilized,
the deductions and losses generated by the corporation can be passed
through to its shareholders. 60 In subsequent years the shareholders
may find it advantageous to revoke the election,6 1 keeping most of
the earnings in the corporation and allocating the cash generated
through the depletion reserve for further exploratory ventures. In
addition, a corporation could also issue section 1244 stock up to an
aggregate of $500,000. To the extent section 1244 stock is used, any
loss realized as a result of the sale or worthlessness of the stock can
be taken as an ordinary loss. 62 However, the $500,000 limitation,
along with other section 1244 requirements,63 might undesirably
limit the size of the fund.
Subchapter S fails to remove one serious disadvantage of the
corporate form; i.e., distribution of depletion reserves will gen-
erally be taxed as a dividend to the extent statutory depletion exceeds
cost depletion. Nevertheless, if such reserves are not distributed,
they do not constitute part of the corporation's undistributed net
income for the purpose of determining a shareholder's taxable share
of corporate income.6 4  Accumulation of depletion reserves in an-
ticipation of further exploration may be feasible in the case of a
relatively close-knit group interested in ultimately building a pro-
ducing company. Presumably the investor-shareholder would bene-
fit from the corporate growth through the sale of his shares or possi-
bly upon the ultimate dissolution of the corporation, both of which
events would yield capital gain treatment. It is essential, however,
-o Id. § 1374.
61 Revocation may be effected if consented to by all the shareholders. See id.
§ 1872 (e) (2). A Subchapter S corporation with exploration deductions subject to re-
capture under § 617, see text accompanying note 32 supra, may find it advisable to
revoke its election in the year in which income is to be restored, since taxation of such
restored income at corporate rates would probably yield less tax liability than taxation
at individual rates.
62 INT. Rzy. CODE OF 1954, § 1244 (a).
61 Section 1244 (c) requires a plan under which stock is to be issued within two
years of its adoption. Further, the total of the equity capital of the corporation on
the adoption date and the aggregate amount to be issued under the plan must not
exceed $1,000,000.
64 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 611, 1873 (b)- (d).
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that the collapsible corporation provisions of the Code 5 be avoided
both with respect to sales of shares by any participant with a greater
than five percent shareholding and upon liquidation of the corpora-
tion. Generally these provisions do not pose problems for companies
developing mineral properties unless particular shareholders can be
classified as "dealers" for tax purposes. However, if a shareholder-
investor has been involved in other mineral operations, he might
find himself possessing the condemning qualifications. This could
be particularly true of the manager-sponsor, assuming that he is a
shareholder, or some of the shareholder-investors who may have been
tempted to participate in simultaneous drawings relating to federal
oil and gas leases.06 Moreover, the acquisition of such leases with a
view to reselling them to major oil companies is very likely to yield
dealer classification.0 7
Even with Subchapter S qualification, the corporate form may be
less desirable for a fund engaged in exploration for minerals other
than oil and gas. If such a corporation utilized section 615, it would
be subject to a single $100,000/$400,000 limitation, whereas if the
fund were organized as a partnership, each partner would have a
separate $100,000/$400,000 limitation, thus permitting a greater
exploration deduction for the same "venture." 68 However, if some
Or Id. § 341. This provision converts what would be capital gain on some sales of
stock or liquidation into ordinary income and also limits the utilization of § 333 and
§ 337 liquidations. A corporation with undeveloped properties on which oil is dis.
covered is likely to be a "collapsible corporation" within the definition of § 341 (b) (1).
See Honaker Drilling, Inc. v. Koehler, 190 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1960). However, sales
of stock by distributions in liquidation to shareholders owning less than 5% of the
stock are, in effect, excluded from the application of § 341 by the provisions of § 341 (d).
Further, if the corporation's net unrealized appreciation in § 341 (e) assets does not
exceed 15% of the corporation's net worth, and if no shareholder owning more than
20% of the outstanding stock is a "dealer," the collapsible corporation provisions will
be inapplicable for most purposes. Generally, § 341 (e) assets are those items such as
inventory which produce ordinary income when sold. Hence, an exploration and de-
velopment company would not have substantial assets of this nature unless it also traded
in leases and other mineral rights. For an excellent discussion of the complex col-
lapsible provisions see generally Pye, How To Avoid the Section 341 Trap in Disposing
of Oil and Gas Interests, 1967 P-H OIL & GAs TAXEs 4012.
O6 For a discussion of federal oil and gas leases see text accompanying note 13
supra. Since original acquisition costs are deductible, e.g., Commissioner v. Miller,
227 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Dougan, 214 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1954),
some high-bracket taxpayers are tempted to play the federal "lottery."
67 Compare Greene v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
717 (1944), with Chadwell v. United States, 44 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1300 (W.D. Okla.
1953).
68 See text accompanying notes 37-48 supra.
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of the individual shareholders had exhausted the section 615 limits,
the organization of a new corporation would create a new section 615
deduction. Of course, the corporation might find it advantageous
to rely on the section 617 deduction.
Finally, if the manager-sponsor is an individual, it may be
feasible for him to become a shareholder in the Subchapter S corpo-
ration. If, as is more likely, the manager-sponsor is a corporation, it
would have to remain outside of the Subchapter S entity in order
to preserve the favored tax treatment. Thus, there may be certain
advantages in the utilization of a limited partnership consisting of
the sponsor as general partner and the Subchapter S corporation as
the limited partner. This approach is discussed further below. 9
Despite the tax difficulties attendant utilization of the corporate
form, it has many well-known advantages as a vehicle for carrying on
mineral operations, such as limited liability, free transferability of
interests, convenience of centralized management, relative liquidity
for investors, perpetual existence, continuity of existence, and well
established legal doctrines defining the relationships, obligations, and
rights of the participants.
FORM OF ORGANIZATION-CO-OWNERS JOINT
OPERATING AGREEMENT
In the past co-ownership operating agreements have typically re-
lated to the development of a specific property in which the investors
become co-tenants by acquiring fractional undivided interests and
then designate one of the co-owners as operator.70 Because of the
widespread use of such agreements, particularly in connection with
farm-outs, they have become reasonably standardized. Nevertheless,
the four exploration funds employing this device have utilized some
ingenious adaptations.7 ' The exploration fund usually has no prop-
60 See text accompanying notes 185-41 infra. Presumably a preferable arrangement
would allow the sponsor to become the general partner and the individual investors
limited partners. See note 61 supra, however, for one situation in which the use of
a separate corporation as a limited partner may be advantageous.
70 Co-ownership operating agreements may result from the sale of undivided in-
terests for the purpose of raising funds to explore a specific property, see note 9
supra, or from a farm-out arrangement under which the owner of a lease, for example,
conveys an undivided one-half interest in return for the assignee's commitment to drill
a well at the assignee's expense and risk.
71 The three funds examined which were organized as limited partnerships also
utilized standard operating agreement arrangements between the limited partnership
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erties at its outset. Thus, a contractual agreement is entered into
under which the investors agree to advance funds and the sponsor
agrees to acquire and drill oil and gas properties with such funds.
Once a property is acquired, the investor becomes a co-owner of the
property and operations are carried on under a more or less standard
operating agreement designating the manager as operator. Title to
properties is generally taken in the name of a nominee, although at
least one fund agrees to assign to the investor his fractional un-
divided interest upon demand.
One explanation of the popularity of such arrangements is the
fact that each co-owner can take his proportionate share of the deduc-
tions. However, it is essential that the group of co-owners avoid
classification as an association which is taxable as a corporation.
Absent an organization utilized for joint-profit purposes, there is no
association. 72 Based on administrative rulings of the IRS, the ques-
tion of whether co-owners have joint-profit objectives is determined
by the arrangements relating to the marketing of mineral produc-
tion.73 Thus, practitioners have assumed that considerable, if not
complete, control can be vested in the operator in carrying on
the mineral operation provided each individual co-owner retains
control over the disposition of his share of production. Standard
provisions designed to accomplish such a result recite that each co-
owner reserves the right to receive his proportionate share of produc-
don in kind, and that until the exercise of such right, the operator
shall have revocable authority as the co-owner's agent to dispose of
production and to enter into contracts for the sale of production
provided such contracts do not exceed the minimum needs of the in-
dustry and in no event are for a period in excess of one year. The
operator may have similar revocable authority from other non-
operators without condemning the "entity" as an association. If,
however, the operator has irrevocable authority from two or more
and the party responsible for carrying out drilling activities, who was usually an
affiliate of the sponsor.
"The Code defines a corporation to include "associations." INT. REv. CODE Or
1954, § 7701 (a) (3). "Since associates and an objective to carry on business for joint
profit are essential characteristics of all organizations engaged in business for profit
. . . the absence of either of these essential characteristics will cause an arrangement
among co-owners ... of such property for the separate profit of each not to be classified
as an association." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (2) (1960).
7 I.T. 3948, 1949-1 CuM. Buur. 161; I.T. 8930, 1948-2 CuM. BuL.. 126.
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co-owners to dispose of production, or has revocable authority per-
mitting him to contract for periods exceeding the minimum needs of
the industry or one year, whichever is less, the entity will be con-
sidered an association and hence taxed as a corporation.
All of the four funds utilizing this type of arrangement contained
the standard provisions giving each co-owner "control" over his share
of production. The fund agreement, however, enhances the control
usually exercised by the operator by designating him manager of the
fund, for this position generally grants him unlimited discretion as
to the acquisition, exploration, and operation of mineral properties.
Yet, all four prospectuses included opinions of counsel that the
arrangement was not an association taxable as a corporation, and
two of them referred to prior favorable rulings from the IRS with
respect to similar funds. Nonetheless, the investor-co-owner's mere
theoretical right to control the disposition of his share of production
provides at best an unstable basis for the conclusion that a pooling
of funds by several investors with a sponsor who has such un-
restricted control is not a joint-profit enterprise. One Tenth Circuit
decision,74 for example, has looked through the somewhat artificial
assumptions behind the administrative rulings and concluded that
the co-ownership arrangement there in question was an association
subject to taxation as a corporation, even though for the most part
it complied with the IRS's pronouncements. The Service, however,
has never repudiated these rulings and has generally shown a dis-
position to depart from them only in those instances in which com-
plete compliance was questioned.7 5
Assuming that a co-ownership arrangement can avoid classifica-
tion as an association, it will be taxed as a partnership 6 unless the
co-owners elect to be treated as joint owners, taxed individually and
not as partners.77 All of the operating agreements utilized by the
71 United States v. Stierwalt, 287 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1961).
75 See John Provence #1 Well v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1963). See
also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
70 Bentex Oil Corp., 20 T.C. 565 (1953); I.T. 2785, XIII-1 CuM. BULL. 96 (1934).
See also Rev. Rul. 54-84, 1954-1 Cumf. BuLL. 284. If the co-ownership arrangement is
taxed like a partnership, it is important that the "partnership" make the appropriate
election to deduct intangibles. See text accompanying notes 22-37 supra. If election
is not made by the partnership, the individual partners will have to capitalize such
expenditures.
7 INT. R:EV. CODE OF 1954, § 761 (a). Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1 (a) (2) (iv) (1956) out-
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four funds examined above made the appropriate election for ex-
clusion from the partnership provisions (Subchapter K) of the Code.
FoRm OF ORGANIZATION-PARTNERSHIPS
The partnership, particularly a limited partnership, is in many
respects an ideal form of organization for an exploration fund and,
as previously noted, three of the seven funds examined were limited
partnerships. If, however, the tax advantages of utilizing the partner-
ship form are to be realized, it is essential that the partnership not
be classified as an association taxable as a corporation." Under the
formula set forth in the current regulations, neither the typical gen-
eral partnership nor the typical limited partnership organized under
the Uniform Partnership and Uniform Limited Partnership Acts is
such an association. 9 Furthermore, these regulations appear to be
motivated by a desire to deny professional associations corporate
status for tax purposes.8 0 Nonetheless, a careful practitioner may
wish to adopt additional safeguards in drafting a limited partnership
agreement to guard against the condemning classification. It is
believed that the inclusion of the following provisions will be helpful
for this purpose:
lines the procedure to be followed by partners making an election to be taxed indi-
vidually.
" Although § 7701 (a) (2) of the Code presents a definition of "partnership," this
separate treatment does not preclude the application of § 7701 (a) (3) which defines
a "corporation" to include "associations." See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (b) (1960).
"' The critical characteristics of a corporation under the IRS formula are: (I) con-
tinuity of life; (2) centralization of management; (3) limited liability; and (4) free
transferability of interests. To be classified as an association the organization must
have more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2 (a) (3) (1960). Thus, the regulations provide that centralized management
does not exist in a limited partnership organized under the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act unless substantially all of the partnership interests are owned by the limited
partners. Id. § 301.7701-2 (c) (4). The regulations also provide that personal liability
does exist as to the general partner in such a limited partnership unless he has no
substantial assets other than his interest in the partnership and he is merely a "dum-
my" acting as agent of the limited partners. Even if he were such a "dummy," the
limited partners would have personal liability. Id. § 301.7701-2 (d) (2). Accordingly,
a limited partnership, which does not ordinarily have centralized management or
limited liability, is not an association under the formula.
80 The refusal to extend corporate status to professional associations is, of course,
an attempt to deny such organizations the benefit of qualified pension and profit
sharing plans under Subchapter D of the Code. In view of the liberalization of the
tax laws relating to comparable Keogh plans for the self-employed, this motivation
has disappeared in part, although not entirely. See Keogh-Smathers Act, 76 Stat. 809
(1962) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401, 404).
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(1) Termination of the partnership within a specified period of
time. This may be coupled with another -provision that the
partnership shall continue thereafter on a year-to-year basis with
the general partners having the right to terminate at the end of
each year upon giving advance notice.
(2) Termination of the partnership in the event of death, in-
sanity, withdrawal, or bankruptcy of a general partner. This
may be coupled with a provision that the partnership may con-
tinue with unanimous consent of the limited and general part-
ners.
(3) Unrestricted withdrawal rights for general partners. This
is an aspect of (2) above.
(4) Termination of the partnership upon assignment of the in-
terest of a general partner. This may be coupled with a pro-
vision that such an assignment may be made with unanimous
consent.
The purpose of the foregoing provisions obviously is to preclude
the partnership from having continuity of existence and free trans-
ferability of interests. Undoubtedly, practitioners will differ as to
the necessity for including all of these provisions.81
Unlike the corporate form of organization, the partnership al-
ternative avoids the taxation of distributed statutory depletion re-
serves. 82 First, partnership distributions in excess of basis are taxed,
81If the sponsor-manager/general partner retains only an interest in profits, it
might be argued, though not very convincingly, that centralized management exists
on the theory that the limited partners own substantially all of the interests in the
partnership. See note 79 supra. However, notwithstanding the statement in the regu-
lations that a limited partnership does not ordinarily possess centralized management,
see id., the limited partnership exemplifies the regulation's general definition of that
characteristic: "An organization has centralized management if any person (or any
group of persons . . . ) has continuing exclusive authority to make the management
decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for which the organization was
formed." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (c) (1) (1960). Paragraph (1) of the text is probably
not sufficient to avoid "continuity of life" unless coupled with paragraph (2). See id.
§ 301.7701-2 (b) (1). In addition to paragraph (4) of the text, which relates to free trans-
ferability of interests, it may be desirable to limit assignments by the limited partners,
since with such limitations it is clear under the regulations that free transferability
does not exist. If interests can be transferred subject to a right of first refusal, "a
modified form of free transferability exists" which will be accorded less significance
in determining association classification than if present in an unmodified form. See id.
§ 301.7701-2 (e). In the author's judgment, it is advisable to take all possible pre-
cautions to avoid association classification.
82 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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but only at capital gain rates.8 3 Secondly, and most important, each
partner's basis in the partnership is increased ratably to the extent
statutory depletion exceeds cost depletion.s4 Accordingly, in most
instances the distribution of depletion reserves merely reduces the
basis by a corresponding amount and, hence, is not taxable.
The use of the partnership form generally will permit the in-
vestors in an exploration fund to derive the benefit of tax deductions
which would not have passed through the corporate form. While
depletion will be taken by the partnership, the effect is to reduce the
individual partner's share of partnership taxable income. Further,
as noted above, distribution of depletion reserves can ordinarily be
made to the partners without adverse tax consequences. Moreover,
the deduction for intangible drilling and development costs incurred
in preparing oil and gas wells is taken directly by the individual
partners.85 Yet, it is important to note that the election to deduct
these costs must be made by the partnership,80 and the failure of
the partnership to elect such a deduction in the appropriate year
will result in the capitalization of these expenditures8s Until the
1966 amendments adding section 617 of the Code, the partnership
was similarly to elect whether exploration expenditures relating
to minerals other than oil and gas were to be deducted or capitalized;
but the individual partners took such deduction directly into their
own tax accounting."8 However, with the advent of section 617, the
individual partners also make their own separate elections under
sections 615 or 617.89 As previously noted, one of the advantages of
a partnership over a corporation in this regard is the flexibility with
respect to such elections, for each individual partner is subject to
separate limitations under section 615,90 while those involved in an
incorporated enterprise are allowed only one ceiling, that which can
8 1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 731 (a) (1), 741.
8
, Id. § 705 (a) (1) (c).
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (a) (8) (1956).
85 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 703 (b).
1 Cf. Bentex Oil Corp., 20 T.C. 565 (1953); Rev. Rul. 54-42, 1954-1 Cum1. BULL. 64;
I.T. 3713, 1945-1 Cum. BULL. 178.
Is Treas. Reg. §§ 1.702-1 (a) (8), 1.703-1 (b) (1956).
89 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 703 (b): "Any election affecting the computation of tax-
able income derived from a partnership shall be made by the partnership... and any
election under section 615 ... or under section 617... shall be made by each partner
separately."
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (a) (8) (1956).
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be taken by the entity. The deduction for development expenditures
relating to minerals other than oil and gas is taken by the partner-
ship, but, as in the case of the depletion deduction, this has the
effect of reducing each partner's distributive share of partnership
taxable income.90
The extent to which the partnership form permits flexibility
in allocating deductions to the investors is discussed at some length
below in connection with the related problem of the tax consequences
of the sponsor's acquisition of an interest in the mineral properties.92
FORM OF ORGANIZATION-THE MINING PARTNERSHIP
The mining partnership is a distinct and somewhat unique form
of business entity which developed to meet the needs of prospector-
oriented financing of the early mining days in the West. 93 While it
is possible that co-ownership arrangements may result in inadvertent
classification as a mining partnership for certain purposes,94 it is also
conceivable that the organizers of an exploration fund might de-
liberately create such an arrangement. A mining partnership differs
from a general partnership in that the death, insanity, or bankruptcy
of a partner does not terminate the partnership; interests may be
freely assigned with the assignee of a partnership interest substituted
as a partner; a majority in interest can bind the dissenting partners,
01 As is well known, a partnership as such is not subject to tax, although the
partnership computes its taxable income and files an information return. Rather, the
individual partners are taxed on their distributive shares of partnership taxable in-
come. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 701-704. Since development expenditures are not
among those items which § 702 requires each partner to take into account separately,
they are considered in determining the taxable income of the partnership. As to
minerals other than oil and gas, development expenditures such as stripping costs
and the cost of sinking a shaft can be deducted, deferred, or capitalized in much the
same manner as exploration expenditures under § 615, see text accompanying notes 22-
48 supra, but there is no limit on the amount that can be deducted or deferred, see INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 616. While such development deductions are important with
respect to the development of established ore bodies, they are not likely to play an
important role in the formative stage of an exploration fund and hence have not been
emphasized in this article. For a discussion of § 616 see generally Bloomenthal, A
Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt. 1), 1 LAND & WATER L. RIv. 77, 121-24
(1966).
02 See text accompanying notes 128-41 infra.
0 3 See generally 4 RocKy MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAw FOUNDATION, AMERICAN LiAW OF
MINING §§ 22.27-.47 (1960). California, Idaho, and Montana have statutory provisions
relating to mining partnerships but generally these statutes are largely declaratory of
the "common law." Id. § 22.31. It is interesting to note that mining partnerships also
have English antecedents. See generally Kahn v. Smelting Co., 102 U.S. 641, 645 (1880).
14 See text accompanying notes 211-12 infra.
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while individual partners have no authority to bind the partnership;
and, although the managing partner has considerable inherent au-
thority in the conduct of partnership affairs, this authority is said
to be less than that possessed by a managing partner in an ordinary
partnership. 95 A mining partnership may not, however, be an
attractive vehicle for organizing an exploration fund, since investors
will be subject to unlimited liability.96 Also, this form is more likely
to be characterized as an association taxable as a corporation than is
a limited or general partnership. Since there exists free transfer-
ability of interests, continuity of life, and a form of centralized man-
agement, only one of the four characteristics-limited liability-of a
corporation which the IRS regards as significant is missing. Thus,
under the IRS formula that an organization will be classified as an
association when it has more corporate than non-corporate charac-
teristics, the ordinary mining partnership would appear to be an
association taxable as a corporation.97 Appropriate drafting, how-
ever, might limit continuity and/or transferability, 8 with the result
that the four crucial elements would be equally balanced. Such
drafting may be sufficient to avoid association classification, particu-
larly in view of the informal structuring of centralized management
in a mining partnership. Nevertheless, the practitioner would be
well advised to obtain a ruling from the IRS before relying on this
form with the expectation that condemning classification can be
avoided. Finally, it should be noted that a partnership engaged in
mining activities is not per se a "mining partnership." However, in
utilizing a partnership form for an exploration fund, it may be ad-
visable to provide expressly that the partnership either shall or shall
not be deemed a mining partnership.
ALLOCATING DEDUCTIONS TO INVESTORS AND THE EFFECT ON
THE SPONSOR'S INTEREST
The seven funds examined all attempted to allocate the deduc-
tion for intangibles to the investors, which necessarily affects the type
91 4 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 93, §§ 22.33-A0.
"Id. §§ 22.44-A5.
97 See note 79 supra.
08 There would appear to be little purpose in forming a mining partnership, and
presumably a limited partnership would be a preferable vehicle. About the only
advantage from the standpoint of the investors is that the mining partnership would
offer them some participation in the management of partnership affairs.
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of interest to be received by the sponsor. The arrangement most
favored was to provide that the sponsor's interest in the properties
should be in the nature of a "carried interest." Under this arrange-
ment the sponsor is not entitled to any part of the proceeds from
production until the investors have received all costs of drilling,
completing, and operating the well. Thereafter, the sponsor re-
ceives his designated share of production and pays his proportionate
share of operating costs. Two of the funds granted the sponsor a net
operating profit interest. Since under such an arrangement ex-
penditures for drilling and completing the well are not included as
costs in determining net operating profits, the sponsor is permitted
to participate immediately in proceeds from production. One of
the funds retained a small overriding royalty percentage which could
be converted after payout into a net profit interest percentage. It
is interesting to note that in the three limited partnerships in which
the general partner was the sponsor, participation in the venture was
achieved by the grant of a property interest rather than a share of
partnership profits.99
The arrangements employed by the seven funds seem to be well
designed to achieve the reasonable objective of the parties that in-
vestors retain the deduction for intangibles and pay tax on all the
income received by them during payout. However, the arrange-
ments may result in receipt by the sponsor of taxable income to the
extent of the value of the interest he received. Further, because of
the unsettled tax lore relating to carried interest arrangements,
minor differences in form may upset the tax planning objectives.
The following are illustrative of the difficulties encountered by plans
utilizing a carried interest:
(1) Under one arrangement, usually characterized as a Mana-
ban'00 carried interest, L, the owner of the lease, assigns the entire
00 For a possible explanation of why this was done see notes 128-29 infra and
accompanying text. One of the three limited partnership funds retained an over-
riding royalty in the property, but created a hybrid by providing that its income from
this source would be its share of partnership profits. Another of the funds retained
no interest in the exploratory well drilled, but received a working interest in the
adjoining acreage.
100 Manahan Oil Co., 8 T.C. 1159 (1947). The actual facts of this case differed from
those presented in the text in that the holder of the lease assigned only one-half of
this interest and permitted the assignee to receive the income and take the deductions
attributable to an additional one-fourth of the assignor's original interest until the
payout was completed,
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lease to 0, the operator, with a provision to the effect that upon
complete payout'01 a one-half interest in the lease is to revert to L.
Under this arrangement 0 reports one hundred percent of the pro-
ceeds as taxable income during payout and takes one hundred per-
cent of the deductions. These are the tax consequences that the
IRS appears to favor, and hence it usually is contending for a
Manahan approach. Proposed regulations, since withdrawn, relating
to the deduction for intangibles expressly adopted an approach that
is compatible with this result.0 2
(2) Under a second arrangement, referred to as an Aber-
crombie'08 carried interest, L assigns to 0 a fifteen-sixteenths interest
in a lease which provides that 0 is to be entitled to all of the proceeds
during the payout period. In Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie
Company,104 the Fifth Circuit held that 0 had in effect made a loan
to L of the amounts advanced to pay L's proportionate share of the
cost. Hence, the proceeds attributed to L's interest during payout,
although actually received by 0, were taxable to L. It follows from
this approach that L can deduct his proportionate share of the in-
tangibles. The Fifth Circuit has held that L can take such a deduc-
tion at the time of the expenditure, even though there is no guaran-
tee that production from the well will be sufficient to assure pay-
out.10 5 However, Weinert v. Commissioner,1o6 a more recent Fifth
Circuit decision, suggests that this court is about to abandon A ber-
crombie and adopt the Manahan approach in this situation as well.
Interestingly enough, although the Commissioner at one time ac-
quiesced in Abercrombie,0 7 he has generally argued for a Mana.
han'08 result, probably because of his occasional lack of success with
the Abercrombie approach.109 The withdrawn proposed regulations
101"Payout" occurs at the point of time at which the cumulative aggregate net
revenues from operations are precisely equal to the drilling and completion costs.
112Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (a) (2) (4), 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (1960), withdrawn by
T.D. 6836, 1965-2 Cum. BurL. 182. The withdrawal of the regulation probably does
not reflect a change of position in this regard by the IRS. See K. MILLER, OIL & GAS
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 205 n.2 (1967).
108 Commissioner v. J.S. Abercrombie Co., 162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947).
10 L Id.
°"'Prater v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1959).
1 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961).
107 1949-1 Cum. BuLL. 1.
108 See Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 757 n.14 (5th Cir. 1961).
10 9 Id.
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dealing with intangibles gave what is in effect an Abercrombie ex-
ample and applied to this example the Manahan result.110
(3) Under a third arrangement, the Herndon"'. carried interest,
L assigns to 0 both a one-half interest in the lease and an oil pay-
ment to be made out of one hundred percent of L's reserved in-
terest until 0 has recovered therefrom the amount of L's share of
drilling, completion, and operating costs. The assumed result under
this approach has been to permit 0 to deduct only one-half of the
intangibles; to deny L the right to deduct any intangibles, since
they are not incurred by him; and to tax 0 on one hundred percent
of the proceeds, half of which 0 receives from his undivided in-
terest and the balance of which is received from the oil payment.
Between 1956 and July 15, 1965, the Internal Revenue Service
had under consideration proposed regulations which would have
eliminated in large part the uncertainty relating to carried interests
and other sharing arrangements.1 12 The proposed regulations as
revised in 1960 made it clear that, in a Manahan type carry, the
carrying party could deduct all of the intangibles. Also included
was an example from which it could be concluded that the same
result would follow under an Abercrombie type of interest. Such
a result would have been consistent with the withdrawal by the
Service of its prior acquiescence in Abercrombie"3 and the Fifth
Circuit's repudiation of Abercrombie in the Weinert case. 14 Yet,
no sooner had the situation been crystallized after twenty-three
years of doubt than the IRS restored the prior chaotic conditions
by withdrawing its proposed provisions. The regulations finally
adopted were substantially identical to the 1939 regulations in their
silence as to allocation of the intangibles deduction."15 The adoption
of the final regulations was accompanied by an announcement indi-
cating a willingness to entertain requests for rulings in appropriate
cases and stating that "[i]n such rulings, the decision of the Service
will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each indi-
vidual case." 1 6
110 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (a) (4), 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 1960) (example 1).
211 Hemdon Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 628 (1946).
212 See note 102 supra.
211 1963-1 CuM. BuLL. 5.
'
1 1-Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961). See text accompanying
note 106 supra.
11
, Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965).
110 Announcement 65-63, 1965 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 34, at 53.
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Of the carried interest arrangements in the funds examined,
three appear to be of the Manahan type, whereas one could be classi-
fied as an Abercrombie carry. If the IRS and the courts were to
apply the Abercrombie rationale, the investors in all these funds
would lose part of the deduction for intangibles. Despite the with-
drawal of the proposed regulations, however, it is believed that the
IRS has no desire to revive Abercrombie.117 Nevertheless, in view
of the expressed willingness of the Service to grant rulings in this
context, it would appear advisable for interested parties to obtain
one.
The net operating profit arrangements employed by two of
the funds as well as the retained override arrangement should permit
their investors to take the deduction for intangibles.118 On the other
hand, the net profit arrangement has an adverse impact on the spon-
sor, since it will have to compute statutory depletion on net income
from production rather than a percentage of gross income.11 9 In the
view taken by the IRS, the net amount received by the holder of a
net profit interest represents his gross income from production.
While net profit and override agreements permit investors to
take the depreciation deduction on tangible equipment, 120 carried
interest arrangements which vest a portion of the ownership of such
equipment in the sponsors after payout will to that extent preclude
a depreciation deduction. The investors are unable to take advan-
tage of the deduction because they no longer own an interest in the
equipment, and the deduction will not be available to the sponsor
because it has no basis in such equipment. Conceivably this result
could be avoided by the investors' retaining title to all of the equip-
ment even after payout, but there is a risk that such a retained in-
terest might be classified as a net profit interest.
117 See K. MIL.ER, supra note 102, at 212 n.23.
11s See Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Kirby Petroleum
Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); G.C.M. 22,730, 1941-1 CuM. BuLL. 214.
113 Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Grandview Mines v.
Commissioner, 282 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1960).
220 The availability of the depreciation deduction is based upon the fact that the
investors will be the sole owners of the working interest and will have a basis in the
equipment. Care must be taken in drafting the net profit interest to provide that the
owner thereof acquires no interest in the equipment. As to the carried interest, the
IRS apparently requires the carrier at payout to reduce its undepreciated tangible
equipment account and to increase its leasehold account by a corresponding amount.
See K. MILLER, supra note 102, at 214.
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The principal disadvantage of the arrangement employed by the
seven funds examined is the likelihood that the sponsor will be taxed
to the extent of the value of the interest it received. An analysis of
this problem requires an understanding of the sharing arrangement or
pool-of-capital doctrine established in connection with mineral opera-
tions in 1925.121 It has been clear since that time that if one owns
mineral rights and agrees to transfer an interest in those rights in
return for an agreement to drill a well, the transaction is non-taxable
as to both parties. According to the underlying rationale the owner
of the mineral property has not sold an interest in the property, but
rather has pooled his resources with the party who obligates himself
to drill the well.
The same rationale was extended by G.C.M. 22,730122 to situations
in which an owner exchanges an interest in his mineral property for
supplies and equipment used in the drilling of a well, for the services
of a drilling contractor, or for money pledged to the development of
the property. It has been widely assumed that under this reasoning,
geological, engineering, or legal services could be exchanged for an
interest in mineral property, provided such services related to the
acquisition, exploration, or development of the property, and that
the transaction would otherwise be non-taxable. 1' However, the
IRS now takes the position that the sharing agreement rationale is
not applicable to the contribution of personal services. While it may
be difficult to justify distinguishing such services from those rendered
by a drilling contractor, 24 recent Fifth Circuit decisions tend to
support the IRS position. In James A. Lewis Engineering, In-
corporated v. Commissioner,125 that court, although not explicitly
invalidating the sharing-agreement theory as applied to personal
services, held that the services of a petroleum engineer in planning a
secondary recovery program were not rendered in connection with
"the acquisition, exploration or development" of the mineral prop-
erty. However, in dicta the court did state:
Unless a careful analysis of the reasons underlying the issuing of
GCM 22730 compelled it, the Court would have great difficulty
11 S.M. 3322, IV-1 Cum. BuLL. 112 (1925).
122 1941-1 Cum. BuLL. 214. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (a) (1965).
22 For an excellent discussion see generally Shelton, The Taxation of Oil and Gas
Interests Received in Payment for Property or Services, 5 OIL & GAs INST. 385 (1954).
22 See K. MuAYRa, supra note 102, at 21-23.
12. 339 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964).
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accepting a construction of the Code that would fly in the face
of the general provisions of the tax laws to the effect that com-
pensation for services must be returned as a part of gross in-
come.
126
Further, in United States v. Frazell,127 the parties apparently con-
templated a sharing arrangement involving services. However,
the court concluded that the property interest received for services
was taxable as income. The court viewed the issue as a problem
of partnership taxation and did not refer to either the sharing
arrangement rationale or G.C.M. 22,730. The facts in Frazell were
very similar to those involved in a typical exploration fund, though
on a smaller scale. A geologist worked out an arrangement with two
investors under which he was to provide advice in the acquisition
and exploration of mineral properties financed by them in return for
a carried interest which "vested" in the Manahan sense after the
investors recovered their investment. The parties, with their ap-
parent acquiescence, were assumed to have formed a partnership.
On this basis, the court held that the geologist realized income to the
extent of the value of the interest received in the year of vesting.
The court then proceeded to determine the value of the interest
at the time of payout. While Frazell is complicated by the fact that
the parties formed a corporation prior to payout, it is clear that payout
ordinarily would be regarded as the time of vesting. It would appear
from the court's approach, however, that, depending upon whether
a Manahan or Abercrombie type carried interest is reserved, there
may be a difference in the year in which the income is received.
Whereas in the case of a Manahan carry the appropriate year would
be the year of payout, an Abercrombie carry would produce a tax
in the year in which the interest was created. If production from
the property is insufficient to return initial costs such as that for
drilling, a Manahan carried interest will be advantageous, since the
interest of the sponsor will never vest. Conversely, if oil is found
in commercial quantities an A bercrombie interest is preferable, since
the interest of the sponsor presumably has less value prior to drilling
than it will have after payout.
A sponsor retaining a carried interest in property it contributed
126 Id. at 709.
1-7 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 39 F.2d 885 (1964), cert. denied, 580
U.S. 961 (1965).
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to the exploration fund could probably avail itself of the sharing
arrangement rationale. The fund must, however, possess such prop-
erty prior to raising money from the public. If the funds examined
above provide a reliable guide, however, this is not the usual pro-
cedure. While in many instances the sponsor does acquire properties,
which it then transfers to the fund with a retained carried interest,
these properties are usually acquired with fund monies. Thus, it is
apparent that the sponsor is receiving its interest in exchange for
the management services provided and not because it contributed
the properties. In fact, most of the prospectuses examined specified
that the sponsor received its interest in return for its know-how and
professional efforts. Apparently, the sponsor is either accepting
taxable income to the extent of the value of the interest or antici-
pating the application of G.C.M. 22,730 to personal services. Even if
one could disregard Lewis and Frazell in this context, G.C.M. 22,730
has always required that the interest be acquired in properties with
respect to which the services were rendered. Since some services-
arranging and managing the overall financial program and screening
properties which are not acquired-often are unrelated to any par-
ticular property, it is arguable that, in part at least, the sponsor's in-
terest in a particular property is received for unrelated services.
The three funds which employed a limited partnership attempted
to give the sponsor its interest outside of the partnership. This fact
suggests that counsel may have sought to avoid the impact of Frazell,
which was decided in the context of the partnership provisions of
the Code. This attempted evasion may be a futile gesture, however.
A carried interest arrangement will probably always result in taxable
income to the sponsor unless a convincing rebuttal is proposed to
the Fifth Circuit's premise in the Lewis case that property received
as compensation for services yields taxable income. The Frazell
decision is best explained by the fact that the taxpayer in that case
planned a sharing arrangement, but was trapped under a partnership
rationale which should not have been applicable to the particular
facts. It would appear that the key to the Frazell decision is the
court's statement-apparently correct on the particular facts-that
the amounts recovered by the other partners represented a "skim-
ming of profits"' 28 rather than a return of capital; therefore, the
128 339 F.2d at 886. The court's conclusion came in response to the argument that
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
service-partner received an interest in the other partners' capital
accounts. Appropriate drafting of the partnership agreement could
avoid the Frazell result by limiting the service-partner to a share
of the profits plus his own capital account and precluding any por-
tion of the other partners' capital accounts from vesting in the
service partner. There are, of course, alternative methods of accom-
plishing this result, each of which has varying economic and tax
consequences. Such arrangements include the following:
(1) The sponsor-partner and the investor-partners immediately
share in the profits, but the latter recover their investment as a
return of capital from the first available funds. Assuming that all
of the deductions have been allocated to the investor-partners and
that their respective capital accounts are reduced to the extent of the
deductions, this approach will ensure a "payout period" consider-
ably shorter than that incurred under the typical carried arrange-
ment. While the investor-partners are allocated all of the deductions,
the sponsor-partner will pay tax on its share of partnership income
during the abbreviated payout period even though it is not receiving
any distributions. Thus, the economic impact is that the investor-
partners recover as a return of capital a portion of their investment
and the sponsor-partner builds up a corresponding amount of
capital but at a tax cost to it.
(2) The sponsor-partner immediately shares in partnership profits
and distributions. Under this arrangement, the sponsor-partner will
be paying tax on his share of the income and will have offsetting
distributions from the partnership. The economic effect is that the
sponsor-partner's capital account will not catch up with that of the
investor-partners, since the latter's "preference"-original investment
reduced by the deductions allocated to it-will be delayed until disso-
lution.
(3) All of the partnership income and deductions are allocated
to the investor-partners until their original investment has been re-
turned in the form of partnership profits. During payout the in-
vestor-partners will be taxed on all of the partnership income and
the sponsor-partner will incur no tax. Thus, during payout the
sponsor-partner is neither receiving income nor building up a capital
Treas. Reg. § 1.721- (1) (b) (1) (1956), while providing exempt status for repayment of
contributions to a partner, does not extend to the relinquishment by a partner of his
right to repayment in favor of another partner as compensation for the lattcr's services.
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account. The investor-partners, on the other hand, recover all of
their investment and, in addition, have a "preference" on dissolution
to the extent of their original capital contributions less the deduc-
tions allocated to them during payout. This approach appears to
be most in accord with the general objectives being sought by most
exploration funds. Whichever method is chosen, however, the part-
nership arrangement will have the additional advantage of permitting
all of the depreciation deduction to be utilized.
129
It is essential to note that the court in the Frazell case seemed at
times to be equating the capital contribution of partners with the
assets acquired with such contributions. If such equation gains
further judicial acceptance, the foregoing analysis of Frazell is not
correct.
The above planning techniques are, of course, oversimplified, for
attention must also be given allocation of depletion reserves and cap-
ital gains and losses.130 However, with careful planning it should be
possible to accomplish the general objectives sought and at the same
time avoid giving the sponsor-partner an interest in the investor-
partners' capital accounts. When this result is achieved, section
1.721-1 (b) (1) of the regulations should be applicable. This section
2' Since the partnership would own all of the equipment and thus have a basis,
it would take the depreciation deduction. INT. REV. CoDn- oF 1954, §§ 702-03. For
discussion of a comparable problem if a carried interest arrangement is utilized see
text accompanying note 120 supra.
180 The assistance of a knowledgeable accountant may be helpful in avoiding an
inadvertent distribution of any part of the investor-partner's capital accounts to the
service-partner. An additional problem arises from the fact that the regulations do
not refer to the accounting concept of capital accounts, but rather to the right of a
partner under partnership law to be repaid his capital contribution.
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1 (b) (1) (1956) is based upon the principle of partnership law
that each partner is normally entitled to be repaid his contribution of money or
other property. Thus, the service-partner realizes income when this right-as dis-
tinguished from a sharing of the profits-is invaded. The easiest method of avoiding
such invasion and of complying with the regulation would be to treat contributions
as loans and to provide for repayment of them, a plan which would have the same
effect as illustration (2) in the text and involve a tax cost to the service-partner.
Alternatively, such amounts could be treated as a "preference" on dissolution and,
thus, be left unaffected by allocation of deductions to the investor-partners. How-
ever, it would be highly questionable whether such allocations have economic effect.
If they do not, they will be disallowed. See note 132 infra. Assume that during
a period of time the investor-partners are entitled to all of the profits and take all
of the losses and deductions, thereby reducing their capital account to the extent
losses and deductions exceed profits. This arrangement would appear to be consistent
with the regulations, since partnership law provides that each partner shall be repaid
his contributions and share in profit and losses with partners' contributions being
preferred upon dissolution, Urmoama PARTNERsmp Acrr §§ 18 (a), 40,
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was not applicable in Frazell because, after the investor-partners re-
covered their investment from a skimming of profits, the service-
partner received an interest in the whole ball of wax, which neces-
sarily included part of the investor-partners' capital accounts.
As a general rule the allocation of income and losses among part-
ners will be sustained if such allocation has economic effect. 13 The
allocations outlined above clearly would qualify, since in each in-
stance they affect the partners' capital accounts and, thus, the
amounts ultimately received. While deductions might be allocated
to the investor-partners without reducing their capital accounts by
a corresponding amount, varying economic results would still be
achieved in each of the above examples. 3 2
It should be noted that to the extent deductions result in losses
allocable to the investor-partners, these partners cannot take such
losses in excess of their basis in the partnership. 33 The tax opinions
reflected in the prospectuses of the funds examined fail to note this
limitation. Since many of the deductions are taken directly by the
partner-intangibles in the case of oil and gas, exploration expendi-
tures in the case of other minerals-it may be questioned whether
these are subject to the same limitations. The Code does not liter-
ally impose an equivalent restriction on direct deductions, although
capital losses, which are also claimed individually by the partners,
are specifically limited to the individual's partnership basis. None-
theless, it is probably advisable to assume that such deductions are
subject to a similar limitation, particularly in view of the fact that
the Code requires the partner's basis to be reduced by an amount
Is' Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1 (a), (b) (1956). Other factors considered by the Treasury
are: (1) Whether there was a business purpose for the allocation, (2) whether related
items from the same source are so allocated, (3) the duration of the allocation, (4) the
overall tax consequences of the allocation, (5) whether normal business factors were
recognized, and (6) whether the amount of the allocation was at the time subject to
reasonable estimation.
132 Economic effect could be ensured, for example, by treating deductible items for
accounting-as distinguished from tax-purposes as capital expenditures. If the allo-
cated deductions do not reduce the capital accounts of the investor-partners, the
economic effect is to increase the "preference" of such partners on dissolution. From
the viewpoint of the account, however, the deduction would have only tax consequences
and hence might be vulnerable. Id. § 1.704-1 (b) (2).
"I' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 704 (d). Losses in excess of the basis of the partner's
interest, however, may be carried forward and utilized in the first subsequent year in
which the partner has a basis exceeding zero. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (d) (1) (1956).
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corresponding to the deduction, but explicitly disallows any reduc-
tion below zero.134
If a Subchapter S corporation were utilized to form an explora-
tion fund and the sponsor were a shareholder, his receipt of stock in
return for services' 35 would not only result in taxable income, but
might also yield liability for stock watering' 6 or for issuing stock for
future services. 37 Conceivably the latter problems could be avoided
if no-par or low par value stock were issued and the sponsor paid
nominal cash amounts at least equal to par. Presumably, however, the
IRS would look at the substance of the transaction and conclude
that the stock was issued for future services. A preferable alternative
would be to form a limited partnership consisting of the sponsor
as a general partner and the investors, organized into a separate
Subchapter S corporation, as the limited partner. Under this ar-
rangement not only would the corporate status of the sponsor not
affect the Subchapter S election of the investors, but also, by limiting
the sponsor to an interest in partnership profits and its own capital
account as outlined above, the receipt of such interest should not
constitute taxable income. It might be argued in this context that
all of the income of the Subchapter S corporation is of the dis-
qualifying, passive type;' 38 but this conclusion would necessitate
disregarding the existence of the partnership 39 and thereby stretch
the substance-over-form argument to the limit.140  If the sponsor is
to be the general partner, it may be important for it to have sub-
stantial assets in addition to its interest in the partnership, since an
inability to show financial independence may support the conclusion
"" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 705 (a) (2) (B).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2 (d) (4) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (b) (1) (1955). A transfer
by the sponsor of properties owned by him in exchange for stock might be non-taxable,
if he and the other organizers owned 80% or more of the stock upon the conclusion
of the transaction. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 351, 368 (c).
11 See H. HENN, CORP'ORAxONs 247-57 (1961).
187 Id. at 247.
'38 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372 (e) (5) provides that the election under Sub-
chapter S shall terminate for any taxable year in which the corporation has more than
$3,000 in passive investment income, and such income exceeds 20% of its gross receipts.
Passive investment income is defined as that realized from royalties, rents, dividends,
interest, annuities, and gains from sales or exchanges of stock or securities.
11 If the partnership itself were classified as an association, see text accompanying
notes 77-80 supra, amounts received by the Subchapter S corporation from the partner-
ship would be dividends and, thus, clearly passive income.
140 Leasehold interests held by the fund may be classified as investment contracts and
hence securities. See text accompanying note 145 infra.
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that the entity has achieved limited liability and is, therefore, an
association taxable as a corporation.14.
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
While, as previously noted, exploration funds share common
characteristics with mutual funds and some in fact attempt to give
the appearance of being a counterpart of a mutual fund, they are,
nevertheless, not investment companies as that term is defined by
the Investment Company Act of 1940.142 Yet, only one of the seven
prospectuses examined specifically stated that the fund was not an
investment company.
Any doubt concerning the status of exploration funds under the
Investment Company Act is eliminated by section 3 (c) (11), which
specifically excludes from the definition of an investment company
any corporation substantially all of whose business involves holding
oil, gas, or other mineral royalties or leases.143 The Commission,
however, has proposed an amendment to section 3 (c) (11) which
would confine this exclusion to such companies only if they are "not
engaged in the business of issuing redeemable securities, face-amount
certificates of the installment type or periodic plan certificates.... "144
Significantly, two of the seven exploration funds examined issued
redeemable securities and what appear to be periodic plan cer-
tificates. Moreover, since all of the remaining funds either provide
for commitments payable as called or at specified intervals, it is
conceivable that some of these funds might be deemed to have issued
periodic plan certificates. Such issues, however, do not appear to
be an essential ingredient to an exploration fund operation and
could be readily modified in order to avoid classification as an in-
vestment company under the Act. Those funds not within the ex-
clusion must be engaged "in the business of investing, reinvesting,
or trading in securities" to be classified as an investment company
under the Commission's proposed amendment to section 3 (c) (11).145
1"" See note 79 supra.
142 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
2
4
8 Id. § 80a-3 (c) (11).
11 4 The Commission's proposal to amend § 3 (c) (11) is incorporated in S. 1659, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (b) (5) (1967).
145 Id. Section 3 (a) of the Investment Company Act defines an investment company
as an issuer which "holds itself out as being engaged primarily.., in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1) (1964).
Section 3 (c) (11) presently excludes from this definition "[a]ny person substantially all
[Vol. 1968:193
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Thus, it becomes necessary to determine whether such funds are
investing in securities. To the extent they acquire fractional undi-
vided interests in oil and gas leases, as distinguished from entire leases,
they are clearly so doing. Securities trading could be found in con-
nection with farm-outs and also, perhaps, in those instances where
the sponsor-manager retains or otherwise receives a carried interest.146
If, however, the fund acquired only entire leaseholds, it would be
necessary to classify such interests as investment contracts in order to
regard them as securities. The SEC might take the position that
regardless of the form of the exploration fund, such an arrangement
should be viewed as constituting an "entity,"even though not a con-
ventional one. The Commission could then argue that, while in
form the fund purports to invest in oil and gas properties and to
conduct an oil and gas exploration business, the fund itself is only
nominally acquiring properties and has no real control over the
development of the properties. Rather, the argument would con-
tinue, the fund actually acquired a series of investment contracts,
each of which consists of an oil and gas lease with a management
contract (operating agreement), under which the manager will cause
wells to be drilled. To buttress this position, reliance would be
placed on SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corporation,147 which in-
volved the sale of oil and gas leases with a representation relating
to the drilling of a well, and SEC v. W. J. Howey Company,148 which
considered the sale of specifically described citrus groves with a
management contract. Viewed in the context of these precedents,
the business of the fund consists of dealing in investment contracts,
which are securities, rather than actually operating mineral prop-
erties. Such a conclusion requires a two-step analysis: (1) The in-
vestor in an exploration fund acquires an investment contract or
interest in a profit-sharing agreement, and (2) the fund in turn is
engaged in the business of acquiring investment contracts relating
of whose business consists of owning or holding oil, gas, or other mineral royalties or
leases ...... including fractional interests and/or investment contracts. Id. § 80a-
3 (c) (11).1," Section 2 (a) (35) of the Investment Company Act defines a security to include
"investment contracts" and "fractional undivided interest[s] in oil, gas or other mineral
rights." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a) (35) (1964). For a discussion of the possible classification
of oil and gas interests as securities see generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, SF-cuRrrms LAw 58-
72 (1966).
117 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
148 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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to oil and gas development. The foregoing problem remains aca-
demic, however, unless and until section 3 (c) (11) of the Investment
Company Act is amended as proposed.
If some exploration funds were legislatively classified as invest-
ment companies, significant changes would be required in the format
and practices of such funds. Registration under the Investment
Company Act 49 would, of course, be necessary, and the funds would
be subject to the more stringent reporting requirements of that
Act. 150 In addition, a whole panoply of regulations would come into
play, the most important being the requirement that all transac-
tions, property transfers, etc. between affiliates and the funds would
have to be submitted to the Commission for a determination, after
notice and hearing, that the terms were reasonable and fair.'5 ' More-
over, if pending legislation relating to investment companies were
adopted, sales charges would be regulated and management fees and
compensation would be scrutinized. 52 It is probable, however, that
the exploration funds affected would discontinue the issuance of
redeemable securities or periodic plan certificates, in which event
they would remain within the section 3 (c) (11) exclusion even if it
were amended as proposed.
SECURITIES ACT-WHAT IS THE SECURITY?
When a limited partnership is utilized to form an exploration
fund, the limited partnership interest is a security. 5 3 In many in-
stances, however, the limited partnership is not in being at the time
of the offering, and hence merely pre-organization subscriptions in a
limited partnership are offered.154 Where co-ownership interests are
119 Investment Company Act §§ 7-8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7 to -8 (1964).
150 In addition to filing with the Commission prescribed annual and periodic reports
and statements of share ownership, a registered investment company must transmit
semi-annual reports to its shareholders. Investment Company Act §30, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-29 (1964); 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.30a-1 to .30f-1 (1967).
251 Investment Company Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1964).
15 See S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8 (d), 12 (c) (1) (1967).
153 Section 2 (1) of the Securities Act defines a security to include a "certificate of
interest . . . in any profit-sharing agreement .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1) (1964). Some
commentators would find no security if there were only a few limited partners and no
substitution of partners without consent of the others. See L. Loss, SECURuTs
REGULATION 504-05 (1961). For a discussion of partnership interests as securities see
generally H. BLoommNTrrA, supra note 146, at 78-81.
54 
"Pre-organization subscriptions" are within the Securities Act definition of a
security. Securities Act § 2 (1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1) (1964). It does not appear to be
feasible to organize the partnership in advance of an offering, since § 2 of the Uniform
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offered, it is conceivable that the security consists of the fractional
undivided interests in mineral rights.15 5 Nevertheless, since no
specific mineral rights exist at the time of the offering, it is more
likely that what is offered would be viewed as an investment con-
tract-the investment of money with the expectation of a return as
a result of the efforts of the sponsor'50--or as a profit-sharing agree-
ment.
A related problem is isolating the consideration exchanged for
the security. The issue is most apparent with respect to the sale of
fractional undivided interests in oil and gas rights. The decisions in
this area have varied significantly, with one state court concluding
that only the consideration given for the fractional undivided inter-
est, as distinguished from the cost of drilling the well, was the con-
sideration for the security, 57 and a federal tribunal holding that the
amounts paid for drilling the initial well, the completion costs, and
the cost of drilling additional wells were all part of the considera-
tion.15 Although the former holding is not likely to be followed
since it overlooks the investment contract concept, it does not neces-
sarily follow that completion costs and the cost of drilling additional
wells will be regarded as part of the "purchase price." A comparable
problem of isolating consideration exists with regard to exploratory
funds, since, as noted, the original investment often does not cover
completion costs or the cost of drilling additional wells. The resolu-
tion of the consideration issue is important, because purchase price
determines, among other things, the dollar amount of securities to
Limited Partnership Act requires the filing of a certificate which includes the names
and the capital contributions of each of the limited general partners and since § 8
requires the filing of an amendment to the certificate before additional limited
partners may be admitted. Two of the funds examined included provisions in the
pre-organization subscriptions which gave a designated person a power of attorney to
execute the certificate of partnership on behalf of the investors. A third fund, which
used a dummy limited partner to organize initially, presumably would file an amended
certificate after the partnership interests were sold, for each investor designated the
sponsor as his attorney with authority to execute the amended certificate. Under § 25
of the ULPA the amendment to the certificate is to be signed and sworn to by all of
the limited partners including those to be added after organization.
'11Fractional undivided interests in mineral rights are specifically within the
statutory definition of a security. Securities Act § 2 (1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1) (1964).
10 See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
157 Hammer v. Sanders, 8 Ill. 2d 414, 134 N.E.2d 509, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878
(1956).
I" Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1955). See generally H. BLOOMENTMAL,
supra note 146, at 59-67.
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be registered and the measure of recovery in a civil action for dam-
ages or rescission arising out of the sale of such securities. While it
is impossible to make a definite determination from the prospectuses
examined, they appear to have assumed, with the apparent acqui-
escence of the SEC staff, that only the specific payments provided for
-and not "assessments"-constituted the consideration for the se-
curity. Interestingly, in the somewhat analogous situation of assess-
able securities, the Commission takes the position that each assessment
involves a sale and that the additional charges constitute part of the
purchase price of the security. 159
Assuming that all monies payable under a particular fund
arrangement, including completion costs and cost of drilling develop-
ment wells, are part of the sale price, an important question is
whether there is a continuing offer of the security until these monies
are called for and paid. If a continuing offer is found, the fund
must, among other things, revise its prospectus and furnish the par-
ticipants with the revision. Since in most of the arrangements
examined the investor is committed from the time of his initial
participation to pay his proportionate share of the completion costs,
it would appear that no new investment decision is involved-unless
a decision to breach one's contractual obligation can be viewed as an
investment decision. Thus, there would presumably be no continu-
ing offer. However, there is generally no obligation to contribute
monies to drill additional development wells, although failure to
contribute may result in either forfeiture of a portion of the acreage
or other penalties. Nevertheless, in another context, the existence
of a continuing offer has been held to depend upon whether the in-
vestor is making a new investment decision. 6 0 Of course, if the
SEC concludes that additional contributions to an exploration fund
are not part of the sale price of the security, the issue of whether there
was a continuing offer would not be reached. In those funds in
which investors have the right to elect not to participate in particular
projects, the possibility of an enduring offer is again raised. Because
there is still an element of volition involved, it might be argued that
a currently valid prospectus must be delivered at the time of the
election. Moreover, one of the funds provided for annual commit-
159 Securities Act Rule 136, 17 C.F.R. § 230.136 (1967).
160SEC v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 1957-1961 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
90,861 (D. Colo. 1958).
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ments which could, after the end of the year, be avoided by the
investor if he had participated in the program for three calendar
quarters. This structure raises the distinct possibility that any
offer made after the investor could elect to terminate is a continuing
or new one.
The prospectuses of the funds examined seemed to assume, with
apparent SEC approval, that there was no continuing offer problem
in the situations described above. The SEC's acquiescence in this
assumption may reflect a pragmatic approach, since the funds might
be tempted to eliminate whatever volition investors do have and bind
them to extensive future commitments. Yet, SEC disapproval of
the assumption would promote more informed investor decisions,
for the funds would be compelled to furnish all details relating to
specific properties, a disclosure they currently can avoid by as-
suming that there is no continuing offer. While some of the funds
giving investors an election to participate in particular projects pur-
ported to furnish appropriate information upon which a decision
could be based, the content of these disclosures is not scrutinized by
the SEC staff for accuracy or adequacy as would be the case if a
revised prospectus were required.
Since exploration funds are relatively new on the securities scene,
there do not appear to be any decisions that involve the precise ques-
tions raised above. Accordingly, it may be advisable to obtain SEC
staff rulings when such issues arise.
SlculTES ACT-WHo Is THE ISSUER?
Identifying the issuer of securities offered by exploration funds
is important for a number of purposes under the Securities Act of
1933. For example, an issuer must file and sign the registration
statement'0 ' and is subject to the liabilities imposed by section 11
of the Act for false or misleading statements in the registration state-
ment.6 2 Further, resolution of the question determines in part the
content of the registration statement.16 With respect to a limited
"0 'The registration statement must be signed and filed by the issuer. Securities
Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1964).
102 Section 11 presents a comprehensive scheme of liability directed against the
"issuer" and other designated persons. The issuer, however, cannot avail itself of any
of the enumerated defenses which are available to other defendants. Securities Act
§ 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
'OR Schedule A to the Securities Act, which enumerates information to be included
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partnership existing at the time of the offering, it would appear that
the partnership is the issuer.'0 4 However, in view of the often nom-
inal nature of these partnerships, it would not be unreasonable to
treat the sponsor as the issuer, at least for disclosure purposes. 165
In the other arrangements commonly used for exploration funds,
the sponsor is and has been regarded as the issuer, although it is
possible that the fund itself could be viewed as an entity and as
such the "issuer."' 66 While the foregoing discussion has assumed
throughout that the sponsor is a single entity, in most of the funds
examined the sponsor consisted of more than one entity. Frequent-
ly a subsidiary or affiliate of a large company had been organized for
the specific purposes of offering the interests involved and acting as
issuer, while the larger company acted as manager and derived the
management compensation. The subsidiary or affiliate company was
frequently newly organized, with neither a significant prior operating
history nor very substantial assets. Thus, the financial statements
required of the issuer were easily prepared and not very revealing.
Among the funds studied, one issuer had total assets of $87,000, al-
though its parent, for which financial statements were not included,
was a more substantial company; three reported assets of $10,000,
$12,500, and $1,000 respectively, with no disclosure regarding their
parents; and finally, two issuers had assets of $250,000 cash, but
apparently at one time followed the practice of lending all their cash
back to their parent. The partnership fund examined included no
in the prospectus and registration statement and the additional data called for by the
appropriate form (S-1 through S-14), pertains, for the most part, to the "issuer." 15
U.S.C. § 77aa (1964).
16" Section 2 (4) of the Securities Act defines the term "issuer" to mean every
person-a term which includes a partnership under § 2 (2)-who issues or proposes to
issue any security. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (4) (1964).
1165 The Commission has broad authority under § 7 of the Securities Act to require
by rules and regulations that the registration statement include such other informa-
tion as the Commission may consider necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors. 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964).
I'lThe Securities Act definition of "issuer," see note 164 supra, is adequate for
securities issued by a conventional entity such as a corporation or partnership. How.
ever, some of the unique arrangements employed by exploration funds, not involving
any formal-type entity which issues a security granting the holder rights in the organi-
zation, poses some conceptual problems not anticipated by the Act. While it may be
convenient for Securities Act purposes to regard the sponsor as the "issuer" since it
"issues" the security, such a construction would completely frustrate the registration
objectives of the Exchange Act, see text accompanying notes 175-87 infra, with respect
to such securities.
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financial statements, apparently treating the partnership, which had
but $100 in assets, as the issuer. It is also interesting to note that,
to the extent financial statements were included, only a balance sheet
was required.. 67
The use of a specially created affiliate as an "issuer" probably
does not affect the parent's liability under section 11 in view of the
provisions of section 15 imposing comparable liability on persons
controlling the issuer.' 68 However, such use does affect the nature
of the disclosures, for prospective investors are deprived of relevant
financial information concerning the actual sponsor.
REGISTRATION AND REPORTING
The necessity for registration under the Securities Act will
ordinarily depend upon the availability of an exemption, particularly
the one for private offerings. 69 For the private offering exemption
to be available, the offer must be made to a predetermined group of
investors having available information comparable to that which
would be included in a registration statement. 70 If, as is usually the
case, such an offering is made to persons other than institutional in-
vestors, a serious question frequently arises as to whether such in-
vestors are sufficiently "sophisticated" and have adequate informa-
tion available to them to satisfy the foregoing criteria. The fact
that the investors are high-bracket taxpayers does not per se establish
such sophistication,' 7' although investors in this category who employ
their own geologists and other experts to assist them in their invest-
ment program would conceivably meet the necessary qualifications.
Yet, in view of the fact that a single offer to a non-sophisticated in-
vestor will destroy the exemption as to all the investors,1 72 it may be
1 The financial disclosure required of an exploration fund parallels the practice
followed with respect to mutual fund proxy solicitations, for there the balance sheet
of the management company, though not an "issuer" for the purpose of such solicitation,
must be included. 17 C.F.R. 270.20a-2 (a) (9) (1967). Apparently, requiring only a
balance sheet represents a compromise which recognizes that some financial information
is desirable, but which allows something less than the usually required disclosure.
"'8 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
100 Securities Act § 4 (1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2) (1964). An issuer confining its offering
exclusively to bona fide residents of the-state in which it is incorporated and doing
business-or resides, if not a corporation-may be able to utilize the intrastate ex-
emption provided by §3(a)(11) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (1964).
11 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC Securities Act Release No.
4552, 1967 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2770 (Nov. 6, 1962).
171 But cf. Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo. 1959).
172 See id.
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advisable to register the securities, even though the actual partici-
pants are few in number.
If an exploration fund having 300 or more participants is regis-
tered under the Securities Act, it will be subject to the periodic
(Form 8-K) and annual (Form 10-K) reporting requirements. 17
Even if a fund has less than 300 participants, it must file such reports
for the fiscal year in which its registration statement becomes effec-
tive.174 Since Form 8-K, a monthly report filed for the month in
which any of the events specified in the form occur, calls for informa-
tion relating to the acquisition of a significant amount of assets other-
wise than in the ordinary course of business, it could be an important
source of information concerning properties actually acquired by a
fund. However, there will always be the question of what consti-
tutes "ordinary course of business" for this purpose. Further, only
limited information need be furnished, including a brief description
of the asset, the consideration paid for it and the persons from whom
it was acquired. While for registrants with less than 300 participants
such reports are required only during a limited period of time, in
many instances this would be a critical period since most exploratory
funds have one-year programs. The most glaring shortcoming of
the present reporting system, however, is the fact that, although
these reports are filed with the SEC and subject to routine scrutiny
by the staff, the reports are not disseminated to the participants nor
made available to them unless the participants themselves take the
initiative in examining the reports or obtaining copies of them from
the Commission.
An exploration fund may also be subject to the registration
requirements of the Exchange Act, which is applicable to any class
of equity securities held of record by 500 or more security holders,
if the issuer has total assets exceeding $l,000,000Y75 Rules adopted
by the Commission specifically define a limited partnership interest
as an equity security for the purpose of registration, and these rules
are probably broad enough to encompass the securities issued by other
types of exploration funds.176 Although the Exchange Act definition
1 Securities Exchange Act §§ 13, 15 (d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o (d) (1964).
" Id. § 15 (d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (d) (1964).
-7- Id. § 12 (g) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1) (1964).
178 Exchange Act Rule 3a 1-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3al1-1 (1967).
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of "issuer"' 177 is substantially identical to the Securities Act defini-
tion, 78 it seems imperative, if the registration provisions of the
Exchange Act are to be given effect in this context, to regard the
fund "entity," whatever it may be, as the issuer for the purpose of
determining whether the $1,000,000 asset requirement has been
met.179 Although the sponsor may be regarded as the issuer for
Securities Act purposes, the sponsor's financial status seems a less
appropriate subject of continued disclosure than that of the fund
itself.18 0
Where securities have already been registered under the Securi-
ties Act, Exchange Act registration can be accomplished with relative
ease and will not add appreciably to the quality of information
available.' 8 ' It is conceivable, but unlikely, that Exchange Act
registration might be compelled of exploration funds not registered
under the Securities Act, since some funds may have offered securities
in violation of the registration provisions of the Securities Act or
pursuant to the intrastate offering exemption. 82 In any event, Ex-
change Act registration will necessitate the filing of current and an-
nual reports with the Commission, a requirement to which a fund
will already be subject if it has registered an offering under the
Securities Act.18 3  In addition, registration under the Exchange Act
will bring into play the short-swing profit provisions of that Act,'184
although the opportunities for "insiders" to trade in the type of
security involved ordinarily are very limited. Perhaps the most sig-
277 Securities Exchange Act § 3 (a) (8), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (8) (1964).
178 See note 164 supra.
170 See note 166 supra.
110 As noted previously, the sponsor which offers interests in exploration funds is
often deliberately created with token assets and is typically affiliated with and under
the control of a larger company. See text accompanying notes 166-68 supra. Such
sponsor-offerers generally have only a few shareholders although the "fund" itself
may have a large number of participants.
181 Securities registered under the Securities Act may register under the Exchange
Act by use of the greatly simplified Form 8-A. 17 C.F.R. § 249.208a (1967).
182 It is not likely that a fund would have 500 participants and yet not be subject
to registration under the Securities Act. However, if the original participants divided
their interests to the extent that there are now more than 500 holders, previous regis-
tration may have been avoided. In such event, or if the securities were originally
offered in violation of the 1935 Act registration provisions, a fund may be caught
within the Exchange Act registration requirement.
18 Securities Exchange Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964). For a discussion of the
reporting procedures see text accompanying note 173 supra.
181 Securities Exchange Act § 16 (b), 15 U.S.C. §78p (b) (1964).
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nificant impact of Exchange Act registration would be the application
of the proxy rules to the infrequent situations in which exploration
funds are required to obtain authorizations or consents from their
participants.8 5  Funds that give their investors a right to elect
whether to participate in particular projects would presumably be
subject to the proxy solicitation rules. It is also conceivable that
requests to participate in the drilling of development wells would be
viewed as a solicitation of consent.8 6 In both of these instances
the proxy rules could fill an existing gap by compelling the disclosure
of relevant information. 8 7
SOME DISCLOSURE PROBLEMS
As one would expect, all of the prospectuses examined referred to
the speculative nature of the offerings. The following is a typical
statement: "Exploration for oil and gas is highly speculative and its
results cannot be forecast. Therefore, investors should not consider
making any investments of funds other than portions of investors' in-
come which is recurring and is normally subject to Federal Income
Tax at high rates." Another prospectus suggested that it would be
inappropriate to invest one's capital-as distinguished from recurring
income-in the drilling of exploratory wells, but that it might be
acceptable to invest capital in completion costs. While all of the
funds appealed to the high-bracket taxpayer, one fund in its supple-
mental sales literature had an illustration designed to show that an
investor need not be in an upper bracket to realize tax savings from
oil and gas investments. Perhaps the most effective means of keep-
ing out the small investor, however, are the high minimum financial
commitments required of participants. Yet, one of the funds had a
minimum commitment of only $1,500 and permitted a $1,300 sub-
scription on a monthly participation plan of three monthly down
payments of $150 and periodic payments of $50 for the balance.
The fund purported, however, to limit its activities to proven and
semi-proven properties, which should make its operation somewhat
less speculative. Significantly, a subsequent program, brought out by
an affiliate of the sponsor of this fund, related to a wildcat program
285 Securities Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964); Exchange Act Rules 14a-
1 (d), 14a-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 (d), 240.14a-2 (1967).
186 Cf. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
187 There was a paucity of information furnished with respect to the properties to
be developed. See text accompanying note 189 infra.
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and required a minimum of $5,000 or a monthly participation plan
of $6,600 with $3,000 down and 24 monthly payments of $150 each.
Disclosures concerning potential conflicts of interest were in-
cluded in the prospectuses of the funds studied although with varying
degrees of emphasis. Statements were typically made concerning the
experience, or lack thereof, of management s8 in carrying on oil and
gas exploration activities, the interest of management in transac-
tions undertaken or to be undertaken between it and the fund, and
management's compensation. Moreover, as previously noted, finan-
cial information in the form of a balance sheet relating to the sponsor
was generally included. Since the funds studied had no specific
mineral interests at the time of the offerings, the only disclosure
relating to properties pertained to the general geographical areas
in which the funds planned acquisitions and the classification of
these properties in terms of wildcat, semi-proven, or proven prop-
erties. 18 9 The manner in which proceeds were to be used was gen-
erally shown in terms of a percentage allocation rather than an
estimate of the number of dollars to be spent. The breakdown in
this regard is significant, since it determines the extent to which
participants will be able to currently deduct their investment. 90
Of the seven funds examined, two included no breakdown at all,
one showed acquisition costs (capitalized and recoverable through
depletion) of an unrealistic one percent, two showed acquisition costs
of twenty percent and one of thirty percent. Expenditures on in-
tangibles were estimated at sixty percent in two funds and seventy
percent in two others. Two of the funds did not break down ex-
penditures between drilling costs, which are generally deductible,
and completion costs, which are generally capitalized and recovered
through depreciation, but showed the combined costs of fifty-five
percent in one instance and ninety percent in the other. One fund
188 Some of the funds examined appear to have made successful efforts to obtain
prestigious persons as officers or directors of the sponsor, including in one instance a
former counsel to the President of the United States.
280 The fact that the funds do not own mineral properties at the time of the
offering greatly simplifies the disclosure problem and avoids the necessity of making
disclosures, for example, that the company's properties have "only a very remote
possibility of obtaining profitable production." Such a disclosure was made by a
fund organized in 1962, which chose to include a specific property in its "portfolio"
prior to offering securities to the public. It is a safe assumption that this disclosure
was required by the staff, and was perhaps warranted by the particular property.
180 See text accompanying notes 99-141 supra.
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had yet another breakdown, estimating equipment costs of twenty-
five percent and lumping deductible drilling costs with certain non-
deductible costs exclusive of equipment in a forty-five percent esti-
mate. Obviously, improvements could be made in such divulge-
ments by requiring the typical SEC disclosure in terms of priority of
the use of funds with separate estimates of the amount deductible
for tax purposes, the amount to be capitalized and recovered through
the depletion deduction, and the amount to be capitalized and re-
covered through the depreciation deduction.
Since all of the offerings studied were on a best-efforts basis, they
utilized the usual disclosure that no assurance was given that any
part of the proceeds would be realized and that, in the case of in-
adequate response to the offering, no part of the proceeds would be
returned to investors. However, all of the funds provided that unless
a specified minimum were committed by participants prior to a
specified date, all monies would be returned without deductions. 191
While the Commission has no power to require return of proceeds
in case of insufficient response, it is reasonable to assume that the
staff "encourages" this approach.
The type of information included relating to tax aspects of
investments in exploration funds has been discussed previously.9 2
At least two of the funds also used a table designed to show, for a
taxpayer in the highest bracket (seventy percent), the tax conse-
quences both of proposed expenditures and of varying hypothetical
net cash receipts realized from each dollar of such gross expenditures.
Thus, one table assumed an expenditure of $100,000 for a participant
and net cash receipts per dollar spent of none, fifty cents, one dollar,
and a dollar and a half. On this basis the table showed a federal in-
come tax credit of seventy percent of $100,000, or a net out-of-pocket
cost to the taxpayer of $30,000, which one can conclude would be
the taxpayer's actual cost if no production were obtained. If pro-
duction were obtained and income equivalent to fifty cents per
dollar spent were realized, the taxpayer's net out-of-pocket cost would
be $5,285. If one dollar were returned for every dollar spent, the
table indicated a net return, after taxes and after giving effect to all
20
1 1n some instances only very short periods of time were provided for return of
investments. For example, one fund agreed to return all amounts received if it did
not raise $500,000 within 35 days.
192 See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
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deductions, of $19,425 in excess of $30,000 out-of-pocket costs to the
taxpayer who invested $100,000, even though the enterprise merely
returned the amount invested. If a dollar and a half in net cash were
realized for every one dollar invested, the taxpayer would receive a
net return of $44,140 in excess of his out-of-pocket costs.
While this table is carefully qualified, it requires a fair degree
of tax sophistication to fully understand it. The net out-of-pocket
cost on a $100,000 investment for a seventy percent bracket taxpayer
is shown as $30,000 even if the well is productive. This would be
true only if over a period of years-perhaps as many as twenty,
depending upon the life of the oil deposit-all expenditures are
deducted either as intangibles, depletion or depreciation. The table
also assumed that the fifty percent of net income limitation under
section 613 will not reduce statutory depletion as is possible, particu-
larly in the year in which wells are drilled. 193 Moreover, the table
assumed, though without explicitly so stating, that a relatively small
percentage of the initial investment would be spent for acquisition.
If, for example, thirty percent of the initial funds went into acquisi-
tion costs, the excess for the most favorable return of a dollar and
a half for every dollar expended would have been approximately
$16,000 rather than the $44,000194 indicated in the table; and at a
101 See note 18 supra and accompanying text. Assuming intangibles are deducted,
the effect is to reduce net income in the year a well is drilled, and, as to that particular
property, possibly to reduce the amount of statutory depletion that could otherwise
have been taken. For tax planning suggestions in this regard see generally Bloomenthal,
A Guide to Federal Mineral Income Taxation (pt. 1), 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 77,
107-11 (1966).
194
Figures Shown Assuming 30%
in Prospectus Spent on Acqui-
-sition Costs
1. Gross Expenditures $100,000 $100,000
2. Tax Credits at 70% 70,000 70,000
3. Out-of-Pocket Costs $ 30,000 $ 30,000
4. Participant's Gross Income 166,500 166,500
From Sale of Oil
5. Less Operating Costs and 16,500 16,500
Ad Valorem Taxes (Assumed
to be 10%)
6. Cash Income Before Taxes 150,000 150,000
7. Statutory Depletion in Excess 41,625 15,785
of Acquisition Costs
8. Taxable Income 108375 134,215
9. Federal Income Tax at 70% 75,860 93,950
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dollar return per dollar spent, there would have been no excess,
rather than the $19,425 shown.195 On the other hand, the most favor-
able return assumed in the table does not represent the upper limit
of return in cases where oil is actually found.
The sponsor or an affiliate of the sponsor of five funds had orga-
nized exploration funds in the past, and the prospectuses of three of
these funds included a record of the past performance of these
prior programs. While two funds had no prior exploration fund
experience, of the three funds reflecting previous experience, one
ran back to 1952 and one had engaged in three and the other in two
earlier programs. Rather detailed information was set forth in the
prospectuses of these funds concerning the prior programs which they
had conducted, including expenditures made, drilling results, pro-
duction history, and income derived from each of the operations.
One fund pointed out that, because of prorationing, the amount of
10. Net Cash after Taxes 74,140 56,050
(7 +8-9)
11. Less Out-of-Pocket Costs as
Shown in 3
12. Excess (or Deficiency) of
Available Cash Over Out-of-
Pocket Costs
195
1. Gross Expenditures
2. Tax Credits at 70%
3. Out-of-Pocket Costs
4. Participant's Gross Income
From Sale of Oil
5. Less Operating Costs and
Ad Valorem Taxes (Assumed
to be 10%)
6. Cash Income Before Taxes
7. Statutory Depletion in Excess
of Acquisition Costs
8. Taxable Income
9. Federal Income Tax at 70%
10. Net Cash after Taxes
(7+8-9)
11. Less Out-of-Pocket Costs as
Shown in 3
12. Excess (or Deficiency) of
Available Cash Over Out-of-
Pocket Costs
30,000
$ 44,000
Figures Shown
in Prospectus
$100,000
70,000
$ 30,000
$111,000
11,000
$100,000
27,750
$ 72,250
50,575
49,425
30,000
$ 19,425
80,000
$ 16,050
Assuming 30%
Spent in Acqui-
sition Costs
$100,000
70,000
$ 80,000
$111,000
11,000
$100,000
none
$100,000
70,000
80,000
30,000
none
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production shown did not reflect the maximum capacity of its wells.196
Three of the programs revealed by one fund showed, as of 1967, gross
income in excess of gross expenditures. As to the other funds, none
of the past programs had returned the monies invested in them. The
sponsor with a fund history going back to 1952 had spent an aggre-
gate of $107 million in all of its programs and had yielded gross
income to participants of approximately $57 million. This fund
published, though not as part of its prospectus, an estimate of reserves
which suggested that its prior programs would overall return from
approximately two dollars and a half to a dollar and seventy-five
cents for every dollar invested, depending upon which reserves are
used-those calculated by the company or those prepared by two
independent petroleum engineers. 97 In the subjective judgment of
the author, of those examined this fund appears to be the best man-
aged in terms of the personnel employed and the full-time nature
of the efforts devoted to the fund. Reserve figures are apparently not
available with respect to all prior programs of this fund. Moreover,
the history of one earlier program is difficult to evaluate because it
involved secondary recovery operations, 98 and there do not appear to
be any accepted engineering standards for evaluating or predicting
the success of such undertakings.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Potential conflicts of interest seem to abound with respect to
exploration funds and, in fact, appear almost inevitable, since in
most cases the sponsor devotes only part of its time to the explora-
tion fund and independently engages in the oil and gas business.
Conflicts, however, may exist not only between the fund and the
sponsor, but between the various funds organized by the same sponsor
as well. The potentiality for conflict is particularly acute in the
1O"To keep production in line with demand, several states impose restrictions on
the amount of oil that may be produced from particular wells or fields. E.g., TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6014 (1962). Often this regulation takes the form of, or has
the effect of, limiting the number of days a producing well may be utilized during a
month. Thus, one of the funds reported that the average monthly producing days
allowed for its oil wells in Texas for 1966 had been 10.28 days compared with 8.68 days
for 1965.
"07The fund estimated total net income of $267 million for its proved reserves,
whereas two independent engineers employed by the fund for this purpose estimated
$197 million and $186 million respectively as the total net income to be derived from
proved reserves.
08 For a description of secondary recovery operations see note 4 supra.
250 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1968: 193
following situations: (1) determination of the price at which the
sponsor sells properties or other services to the fund; (2) decisions
concerning whether properties are to be acquired for the fund or the
sponsor or an affiliate of the sponsor; (3) decisions by the sponsor
concerning which properties he is to assign to the fund, thus per-
mitting the assignment of the less desirable properties; (4) dis-
covery of information in connection with the fund's activities which
would benefit the sponsor.
Some of these conflicts can be minimized, if not substantially
precluded. For example, conflicts as to pricing of properties can
be avoided by providing, as many of the funds do, for acquisition at
cost. 99 The possibility for other conflicts could also be eliminated
by providing, as one fund to a large extent and some of the other
funds to a lesser extent have done, that acquisitions for the fund are
to be limited to areas different from those in which the sponsor
will carry on its own exploration activities. Yet, even when this
approach is adopted, conflicts could still exist between two funds
managed by the same sponsor. One sponsor attempted to prevent
this type of conflict by organizing one fund to engage in wildcat
activities and limiting the other fund to the acquisition of proven
or semi-proven properties. Another fund reduced opportunities for
conflict by requiring the officers and employees of the sponsor to
refrain from engaging in oil and gas activities and precluding acquis-
tions from persons affiliated with the sponsor.200
In two of the funds examined, the sponsor was a substantial in-
vestor in the fund, a factor tending to reduce any motivation to take
advantage of the fund. Moreover, in all of the funds studied, the
199 One of the funds examined disclosed that an affiliate of the sponsor would sell
the fund leases and other properties at "rates comparable to those paid by others in
the oil and gas industry." Yet, while oil and gas leases are widely sold, each lease to
a degree is unique and market prices are seldom established. Another fund provided
that an affiliate of a sponsor could sell the fund leases acquired by the affiliate prior
to the organization of the fund for cost (including allocated overhead) plus 10%.
However, this fund represented that no specific properties had been selected for resale.
The same fund provided that properties acquired and transferred by the affiliate subse-
quent to the organization of the fund would be transferred at cost.
200 Another of the funds examined represented that, although an affiliate of the
sponsor would continue to acquire properties for its own account as well as for the
fund, all properties acquired would first be offered to the fund. Yet, because the
affiliate and the fund were commonly controlled, the same people would be determining
which properties were retained and which would be selected for the fund, In this
particular fund, however, the sponsors were also substantial investors.
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sponsor was dependent upon the success of the fund, if it were to
realize substantial benefits for itself. However, in none of the funds
were all potential conflicts eliminated, and disclosures relating to
such conflicts were somewhat spotty.
With respect to those funds organized as limited partnerships,
it would appear clear that the sponsor as general partner has fiduciary
obligations to the limited partners.201 Similarly, it is very likely
that fiduciary concepts will be extended to the other forms of fund
organizations.2 02  Several of the prospectuses examined, for example,
represented that the sponsor was a fiduciary, although at the same
time attempts were made to limit the sponsor's liability for misman-
agement to either willful or gross misconduct or a failure to exercise
a good faith judgment.2 0 3  However, as others have noted, classifica-
tion as a fiduciary is only the beginning of analysis,20 4 and one must
seek solutions somewhere between the "punctillio of honor" 20 5 and
the fact that participants are generally reasonably sophisticated and,
in some instances at least, consent to the overall arrangement after
201 Singletary v. Mann, 157 Fla. 37, 24 So. 2d 718 (1946).
2 03 In a case in which a co-tenancy arrangement was characterized as a mining part-
nership, the court said: "[T]hose having the majority interest control its management
. . . rendering themselves personally accountable, in an accounting between the part-
ners, for any culpable negligence, or breach of duty, or wrongful conduct, or diversion
of the property from the firm's business to other business in which such managing
partner may be interested .... " Bartlett & Stancliff v. Boyles, 66 W.Va. 327, 330, 66
S.E. 474, 475 (1909); accord, Stephens v. Allen, 314 Ky. 769, 237 S.W.2d 72 (1951).
Other cases have held, without characterizing the arrangement as a mining partnership,
that the operator under a typical operating agreement is a fiduciary. E.g., Beadle v.
Daniels, 362 P.2d 128 (Wyo. 1961); Midcon Oil & Gas Ltd. v. New British Dominion
Oil Co., 21 W.W.R. (n.s.) 228 (App. Div. 1957). The Midcon Oil & Gas case relied
on a "joint-adventurer" and "principal-agency" characterization of the relationship
created. It should be noted that many of the funds examined which utilized co-
ownership arrangements disclaimed the existence of any partnership, but often charac-
terized themselves as a "joint-venture."
.00For a discussion relating to the liability of a sponsor for negligence see text
accompanying notes 220-21 infra.
204 "But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to
further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligation does he owe as a
fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what
are the consequences of his deviation from duty?" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,
85-86 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).
20r "Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctillio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)
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full disclosure of the potential conflicts. Extension of the Investment
Company Act and other regulatory phases of the securities laws
200
could close some of these gaps, but perhaps at a price that would
make it no longer feasible to organize an exploration fund. Within
the existing structure of corporate and securities law there is cer-
tainly room for courts to scrutinize fairness of prices charged for
properties and other services, 207 to prevent the use by the sponsor of
information developed with respect to fund properties, 208 and to
preclude the sponsor from dumping undesirable properties onto the
fund.20 9 Such scrutiny would, of course, require judicial statesman-
ship and involve enlightened manipulation as well as application of
corporate opportunity, fraud, and fairness concepts. In addition, it
would necessitate a further inquiry into the extent to which pur-
chase after disclosure is to be deemed the equivalent of consent and
ratification.210 Since the situations that could arise are so varied and
260 A most attractive solution would regulate transactions between the sponsor and
the fund. See text accompanying note 151 supra. However, the proposed amend-
ments to extend the Investment Company Act to exploration funds would be applicable
only to a few funds and could be easily evaded by changes in mode of operation. Id.
207 Fiduciary concepts relating to "secret profits" and corporate law doctrines scruti-
nizing the fairness of transactions with insiders could be applied in the exploration fund
context. See H. HENN, CORPORArsONS 134-37, 374-77 (1961). The securities laws are
also available to sustain a private action in this general area. For example, an investor
might allege fraud based on the fund management's failure to disclose an intention
to engage in self-dealing, with possible remedies under §§ 11, 12, and 17 of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77g (1964), and/or rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (1967), adopted under § 10 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964). Further, since
the sponsor may be selling the fund a security, see text accompanying notes 147-60 supra,
it may be possible to allege-derivatively on behalf of the fund or through a class
action-fraud in the sale of the security, utilizing the broad fraud provisions of rule
lOb-5. Presumably, a "derivative" action in the case of a partnership would take the
form of an action for an accounting. Utilization of the federal securities laws as a
basis for such actions would permit the plaintiff to avail himself of the liberal venue
and extraterritorial service of process provisions of those laws. Securities Exchange
Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964). Private actions based upon federal securities laws are
in a state of rapid evolvement, with ingenious applications being made at a rate that
requires an up-to-the-minute scrutiny of the cases and the literature. See generally
H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuRIrIS LAW 401-82 (1966); A. BROMBERO, SECURITIEs LAw FRAUD
SEC RuLE lOb-5 (1967).
"IB See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
209 See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
210 Unanimous shareholder ratification will generally preclude a derivative action in
the case of a corporation, and less than unanimous ratification may estop shareholders
who ratify after appropriate disclosure. See H. HENN, supra note 207, at 376, 574-75.
A question remains, however, whether a generally phrased advance disclosure of
possible conflicts is the equivalent of ratification and/or consent.
..... A mAA
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complex, it would be idle to speculate concerning results in particular
situations. However, in view of the uncertainties in this area, counsel
engaged in organizing an exploration fund would be wise to attempt
to minimize potential conflicts along the lines that have been sug-
gested, and to the extent that conflicts cannot be avoided, they should
be fully disclosed in the prospectus of the fund.
MISCELLANY
Except when the corporate or partnership form is utilized, the
exploration fund is based on legal doctrines developed primarily in
other contexts and lacking a history of application. Accordingly,
there are few well defined legal doctrines determining the rights and
obligations of the parties in the absence of, and perhaps despite, spe-
Jific contractual provisions. The lack of precedent necessitates
extreme care in drafting the instruments involved and the use of
insurance or other means of protecting the participants. The co-
ownership joint operating agreement arrangements are particularly
vulnerable on this score, with results frequently depending upon
whether a particular court will classify such an arrangement as a
"mining partnership." While such classification generally depends
upon the extent of the co-owners' control over the operator, some
courts, in particular contexts, have gone far in finding the necessary
control even though, in fact, control appeared to be minimal.211
If a co-tenancy arrangement is characterized as a mining partner-
ship, the participants, despite the agreement among themselves, will
be liable to third parties for the partnership's torts and for contractual
obligations incurred on behalf of the partnership.' 2 Liability for
fund contracts is likely to arise when the operator-sponsor carries
out operations not specifically authorized by the co-owners, or in
situations in which the operator-sponsor has failed to pay all of the
obligations incurred, despite receipt from the participants of amounts
committed by them. Although participants can be protected against
211 See, e.g., Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854 (1954),
in which the court regarded a typical operating agreement as establishing the requisite
control, despite the fact that the operators had the sole right to explore and develop
the land and to hire and control employees. See generally Shepherd, Problems Inci-
dent to Joint Ownership of the Oil and Gas Leasehold Estate, 5 OI. & GAs INST. 215
(1954).
2-1 Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge, 249 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1957); Mud Control Laboratorie
v. Covey, 2 Utah Rd 85, 269 P.2d 854 (1954).
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possible tort liability by requiring the operator-sponsor to take out
sufficient insurance coverage, the risk of contractual liability under
the circumstances outlined may be unavoidable if the operator-
sponsor turns out to be irresponsible. Limited protection would be
afforded by a provision that all contracts entered into by the
operator-sponsor expressly recognize that the obligee is to look solely
to the operator-sponsor for payment. Participants, however, are not
ordinarily in a position to determine whether such contractual pro-
visions have been included.
There would appear to be no legal reason why participants in
an exploration fund should be unable to assign their interests, re-
gardless of the form of organization used. A limited partnership
interest is, of course, assignable, although the assignee can be sub-
stituted only if the certificate of limited partnership so provides or
all of the limited partners consent. 213  In addition, co-tenancy in-
terests can generally be assigned, but subject to the provisions of
any outstanding operating agreement. 214  Nevertheless, all but one
of the funds examined restricted assignments in some manner, In
four of the funds, assignments could be made only with consent;
in two others, the sponsor-manager had a right of first refusal to
purchase the assigned interest; and in the remaining fund, a part-
nership arrangement, the limited partnership interest could be
assigned, though the assignee could be substituted as a limited part-
ner only with the consent of the general partner. While restrictions
on assignment are desirable in connection with a private placement
to assure the availability of the private offering exemption,215 similar
restrictions are not compelled by the Securities Act with respect to
213 UNIFORm LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP Aar § 19 (5). Substitution also requires an amend-
ment to the certificate of limited partnership. Id. § 25.
2141 The typical operating agreement provides that any assignee takes subject to all
the terms of the agreement. Although such a provision would presumably have to be
recorded in order to affect a purchaser for value without notice, very often operating
agreements are not recorded and, in fact, may not be recordable instruments because
they are not acknowledged. Absent an effective provision in this regard, the terms of
the operating agreement may nonetheless bind assignees as covenants running with the
land. See 3 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING
§ 18.4 (e) (1967).
21r See note 169 supra and accompanying text. In order for the non-public offering
exemption to be available, the purchaser must not only have access to information upon
which to make an intelligent decision, but must also acquire the interest for invest-
ment and not with a view to distribution. See generally H. BLOOMENTIfAL, supra note
207, at 146-61,
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securities registered thereunder. Restrictions on assignment can
also be relevant in avoiding classification as an association, and the
consequent taxation as a corporation. 216 But rather than reflecting
tax planning, the principal motivation for such restrictions appears
to be either to give the sponsor control over the selection of partici-
pants or to give the sponsor the benefit of a right of first refusal.
Those funds which contemplate any continuing obligation of
participants to commit monies or of the sponsor to invest such monies
generally provide for some form of termination of the fund program
in the event further investment would prove futile. Nonetheless,
there is rarely any provision made for termination of the continuing
relationship that will result if oil and gas are produced.2 17 Since the
sponsor is ordinarily the operator under the operating agreement, it
presumably will continue to manage the properties and operations
as long as they are productive. Yet, provisions are seldom made for
selecting successors to the operator and, if the operator should prove
irresponsible, the participants do not have well defined legal rem-
edies. There is some authority, however, which would permit a
court to remove the operator and appoint a receiver under certain
circumstances.218  It is possible that partition might also be an
effective remedy, but, if utilized, would probably result in a forced
sale of the fund property.219 Thus, for most purposes the investor-
participants in exploration funds have to view themselves as effec-
tively precluded from participation in management and unable to
remove management. Accordingly, careful consideration should be
given by investors to management's experience, reputation, and con-
tinued availability.
Since there are no well established standards of care required
of the manager-sponsor in his performance under an operating
agreement or otherwise, most of the funds examined attempted to
210 See note 81 supra.
217 Funds commonly provide that the operating agreement shall continue in force
as long as any oil and gas lease subject to the agreement is still in effect.
218 Stephens v. Allen, 314 Ky. 769, 773, 237 S.W.2d 72, 74-75 (1951) (dictum).
210 See, e.g., Harper v. Ford, 317 P.2d 210 (Okla. 1957). The right to partition may
depend, however, both on how a particular jurisdiction classified mineral interests in
property terms and on the provisions of specific statutes relating to partition. See
generally Murphy, A Critique of Partition of Mineral Estate in the United States, 5
ROCKY MT. MINERAL LAW INST. 543 (1960). The operating agreement employed by
one of the funds examined specifically provided that the interest holders were deemed
to have waived any right they may have had to seek partition.
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provide a contractual standard for this purpose. One fund, for
example, provided that the manager should be held to the standard
of care to be exercised by independent oil and gas operators, which
would appear to be a normal negligence standard.220  Two funds
specifically provided that the manager would be liable only for acts
of gross negligence, fraud, or willful misconduct. Three others
deemed that the manager should not be liable for any good faith
act or omission on its part provided it exercised its best judgment.221
Moreover, two of these three funds provided that the manager would
be indemnified for any tort or contract liability it incurred in man-
aging the fund provided it had acted in accordance with the fore-
going standard.
The co-ownership arrangements lend themselves to assurances
that investors will receive current distributions from production.
If production is obtained and each co-owner is named in the division
order executed with the purchaser of the oil, remittances will be
made directly to the co-owner by the purchaser. The operator
typically bills such co-owners for their proportionate share of oper-
ating costs. In fact, an arrangement of this type is often necessary
in order to avoid having the IRS classify the interest as a net profit
interest.~2 Limited partnerships also should have few problems in
distributing cash generated from production to the partners. Care
220 In the context in which exploration funds are organized and promoted, it would
appear that the sponsors should be held to the standard of care applied generally to
one who holds himself out as having special skill and knowledge. See W. PROSSER,
TORTS 164 (3d ed. 1964). Much of partnership law relating to intra-partner liability
has been developed in the context of small partnerships in which all partners participate
in management and none possess special skills. Thus, it is not unusual to find state-
ments such as the following: "A partner is not held to possess the degree of knowl-
edge and skill of a paid agent .... He is not liable to his partnership for the whole
burden of losses caused by errors of judgment and failure to use ordinary skill and care
in the supervision and transaction of business." J. CRANE, LAW OF PAarNRSHIP 368
(2d ed. 1952). Compare the following statement made with respect to the managing
partner of what the court characterized as a mining partnership: "[T]here is a conse.
quent duty of acting in good faith and with honesty and diligence." Stephens v.
Alen, 314 Ky. 769, 773, 237 S.W.2d 72, 75 (1951).
2.1 It appears that these funds were attempting to establish the lesser standard re-
ferred to in note 220 supra with regard to the exercise of due care, and something
akin to the "business judgment rule" as to the exercise of judgment. For a discussion
of the business judgment rule see H. HErN, supra note 207, at 364-65.
222 The IRS characterizes an arrangement under which the operator advances all
costs and then recovers these out of production as an unlimited carry, and equivalent
to a net profit interest. See United States v. Thomas, 329 F.2d 119, 130 (9th Cir.
1964); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 CuM. BuLL. 214. For the tax consequences of a net profit
interest see text accompanying notes 99-141 supra.
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must be taken, however, in the distribution of cash representing a
withdrawal of capital, since such a withdrawal by a limited partner
without compliance with certain procedures will subject him to
unlimited liability. 2 3 Of the funds examined five appeared to con-
template immediate distributions to the extent that monies were
available from production. The other two funds precluded dis-
tributions for ten years, and the cash generated was to be reinvested
in the organization of new limited partnerships. Although investors
in these funds were permitted to withdraw after a minimum period,
the "redemption" price substantially discounted the value of their
interests.
CONCLUSION
While some exploration fund practices are not completely satis-
factory from either a legal or financial viewpoint, such funds play a
worthwhile economic role in channeling capital into the development
of natural resources. In this article an attempt has been made to
chart a course through the somewhat murky legal waters in which
exploration funds are organized and operated. In view of the many
areas of the law upon which exploration funds touch, the task of
putting together such a fund should be a challenging one.
220 See, e.g., UNnroPm LirsuT PARTNERSHIP Acr § 16; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-251,
17-253 (1957). Under § 16 of the ULPA, a capital withdrawal or reduction can be
made only if: (1) all liabilities have been paid or there remains property of the part-
nership sufficient to pay them, (2) the consent of all members is had, and (3) the
certificate is cancelled or so amended to set forth the capital withdrawal or reduction.
To the extent that depletion reserves are distributed, they may represent a prohibited
withdrawal of capital, and the appropriate statutory procedures should be followed.
A few archaic statutes, such as the Wyoming statute cited above, do not include any
procedures for withdrawal of capital. Where this type of statute is in force, considera-
tion should be given to organizing the limited partnership under the laws of a state
which has adopted the ULPA. However, while there is some authority to the effect
that the liability of a limited partner will be determined by the law of the state of
organization, e.g., Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 669, 80 A.2d
906, 908 (1951), authority in this area is sparse, and certainly the state in which opera-
tions are being carried on, if the forum state, would have a sufficient interest to
justify applying its own law. See generally A. EMIENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWvS 424-25
(1962). Although limited partnership acts generally make no provision for qualifying
foreign partnerships, presumably it would be advisable to file and put on record, at
the appropriate offices in the state in which operations are being conducted, a copy
of the certificate of limited partnership.
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